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Abstract
We study the relation between income distribution and growth mediated by structural
changes on the demand and supply side. Using results from a multi-sector growth model we
compare two growth regimes which differ in three aspects: labour relations, competition, and
consumption patterns. Regime one, similar to Fordism, is assumed to be relatively less un-
equal, more competitive, and with more homogeneous consumers than regime two, similar
to post-Fordism. We analyse the parameters that define the two regimes to study the role of
exogenous institutional features and endogenous structural features of the economy on output
growth, income distribution, and their relation. We find that regime one exhibits significantly
lower inequality, higher output and productivity, and lower unemployment than regime two.
Both institutional and structural features explain these difference. Most prominent among
the first group are wage differences, accompanied by capital income, and the distribution of
bonuses to top managers. The concentration of production magnifies the effect of wage dif-
ferences on income distribution and output growth, suggesting the relevance of the norms of
competition. Among structural determinants, particularly relevant are firm organisation and
the structure of demand. The way in which final demand distributes across sectors influences
competition and overall market concentration. Particularly relevant is the demand of the least
wealthy classes. We also show how institutional and structural determinants are tightly linked.
Based on this link we conclude by discussing a number of policy implications emerging from
our model.
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of studies suggest that most OECD economies have changed growth regime
around the 1980’s (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1999; Petit, 1999; Boyer,
2010). Some of the regularities that suggest a change in the growth regime across a range of
countries are in order.
Atkinson (2015), Atkinson and Morelli (2014), and Piketty (2014), among many others, sug-
gest that income inequality has been rising since the 1980’s, after a few decades of decline. While
there are important differences in the level of inequality among countries with different welfare
states, the pattern has been similar across OECD countries.
Such increase in inequality was accompanied by a number of related changes, also common
across a range of OECD countries. Inequality seem to be driven by the increased share of wealth
concentrated in the 10% and the 1% of the population with the highest incomes (Alvaredo et al.,
2013; Atkinson et al., 2011; Atkinson and Morelli, 2014). Since the 1970’s the increase in in-
equality was preceded, and is currently accompanied, by a regular decline of labour shares (over
GDP) (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013; Summers, 2013). Related to this, wage growth and pro-
ductivity growth, once matched, started to diverge at the end of the 1970’s, with the gap between
the two increasing constantly (Lazonick, 2014).
Similar to what happened during other episodes of structural change, process innovation in
the manufacturing sector is increasingly labour saving: capital goods replace more and more
routinised tasks, increasing productivity (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Karabarbounis and
Neiman, 2013). Labour economists have convincingly shown that this is followed by an increase
in the number of low paid jobs, and an increase in the number of high paid jobs (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011), reducing significantly the middle class jobs. Manning (2004), Autor and Dorn
(2013), and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) also suggest that these changes in the labour market are
not independent from changes in the composition of consumption and consumer preferences.
A large component of the increasing difference between the top 10% and the rest is the in-
creased compensations of top classes of workers, with wages, bonuses, profit shares (Atkinson
et al., 2011) and stock options (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Part of these growing differences are
explained by the routinisation of tasks, and part by the financialisation of economies and firms (La-
zonick, 2014; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013; Stockhammer, 2012). The trend which is common
to both is the increased size of firms. The evidence shows that firm average size increases with a
country per capita income (Poschke, 2015) and market concentration (The Economist, 2016), and
is correlated with wage dispersion (Mueller et al., 2015) and CEO pay rise (Frydman and Jenter,
2010). OECD (2017) suggest that recent innovations have increased market concentration and
the innovation rents redistributed to shareholders and managers. And Autor et al. (2017) suggest
that the fall in labour share is related to increase in market concentration and firm size which is
also due to change in consumer behaviour, innovation, and lower rates of creative destruction. As
suggested by The Economist, “part of what is perceived as a global trend towards greater disparity
in wages may actually be the result of the biggest firms employing a greater share of workers”.
In this paper we study the relation between income distribution and growth mediated by struc-
tural changes on the demand and supply side. We study how the relation changes for distinct
growth regimes (Boyer, 1988; Petit, 1999; Coriat and Dosi, 2000) characterised by endogenous
differences in (i) labour relations – compensation, profit shares, and the elasticity of wages with re-
spect to productivity and inflation; (ii) norms of competition – entry barriers and market selection;
and (iii) income related norms of consumption – consumption shares and consumer preferences.
We focus only on structural determinants of income inequality, and we do not consider leaving
any redistributive policy.
We define two regimes. Regime one characterised by relatively more equal labour relations,
more competition and lower selection, and smaller difference in consumption behaviour; and
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regime two relatively more unequal, with relatively more protection for incumbents but higher mar-
ket selection, and larger differences in consumption behaviour. Although we do not aim to repli-
cate any specific historical period, one may think of regime one as a Fordist regime and regime two
as a post-Fordist regime. Instead, we compare the two regimes using results from a multi-sector
model that associates the different regimes to different dynamics of structural changes. We then
study which of the three aspect that in our model define the regimes is more relevant in explaining
the relation between income distribution and growth, by means of a parametric analysis.
We find that a Fordist regime (one) exhibits significantly lower inequality, higher output and
lower unemployment than a Post-Fordist regime (two). We distinguish between institutional and
structural determinants of these differences, although we also suggest that the two types of deter-
minants are strongly related. Institutional determinants are used to differentiate the two regimes
with respect to labour relations, norms of competition, and norms of consumption. We find that,
keeping all other features of the regimes fixed, wage differences play the most important role in
increasing inequality and limiting output growth. Returns on capital and bonuses to managers
magnify the effect of wage differences by increasing the wealth of high wage earners with respect
to low wage earners. The role of the minimum wage, instead, is substantially weaker. The concen-
tration of production also magnifies the negative effect of labour relations on income distribution
and output growth, suggesting the relevance of the norms of competition. However, in our model
we find two opposite effects. On the one hand concentration through entry barriers increases in-
equality and reduces output growth. On the other hand, concentration via market selection reduces
inequality, but has no effect on output. Finally, the norms of consumption have no significant effect
on either income distribution or output.
Structural determinants, instead, are emerging properties in our model. First, in the absence of
redistributive policies, an increase in average firm size have a direct effect on increasing income
inequality. Changes in the structure of production amplify the effect of institutional difference in
wage setting. Second, the structure of the demand also plays a crucial role. Sectors that attract the
largest share of consumption of low income classes tend to be also significantly less concentrated
in our model than sectors that sell mainly luxury goods. The structure of demand also influences
competition: sectors that constitute the largest expenditure shares of the low income classes face
fiercer competition, more selective consumers with respect to price, and therefore tend to exhibit
a low mark-up. This implies lower profits and dividends which would accrue wealthier classes
income. Third, demand plays a crucial role in explaining the differences in output between the
two regimes. Even if regime two catches up in terms of productivity, due to the structure of
demand the more uneven distribution curtails output growth.
Modelling and Defining Growth Regimes
The interaction between labour compensation, competition, and consumption patterns has been
discussed by the regulation theory with reference to different varieties of capitalism (Boyer (1988),
Petit (1999) and Coriat and Dosi (2000)).
We propose a model in which we interpret these three aspects as follows.
Labour compensation, the wage-labour nexus. We distinguish three aspects of the wage labour
nexus. First, we model firms as hierarchical organisations (Caliendo et al., 2015), where workers
are distributed in different tiers with different tasks and wages: at the bottom of the pyramid are
clerks and blue-collars, at the top are the CEOs. In between, there are a number of intermediate
supervisors and managers. The number of managerial tiers depends on the organisation of labour
and on the size of the firm (endogenous in our model). Small firms have less tiers than large firms,
cœteris paribus. Firm size depends on consumer selection, the level of consumer demand, labour
productivity, and the entry of new competitors. Wages are differentiated across tiers, determining
income differences between consumer classes. Together, the number of tiers and the wage dif-
ferences determine the distribution of wages in the population. The larger is the wage multiplier,
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the larger the difference between tiers. Second, workers in managerial positions receive part of
the profits as bonuses or profit shares as part of their compensation, proportionally to their base
wage. The larger is the rate of profits distributed as bonuses, the larger are the differences between
working classes. Third, the minimum wage is a function of unemployment, average productivity,
and inflation. We peg changes in the minimum wage to changes in productivity and prices. The
larger the elasticity of the minimum wage to productivity and inflation, the higher the distribution
of value to workers, and the higher their purchasing power (level of demand).
Norms of competition. In our model competition and market concentration depend on con-
sumers’ selection, firms’ differentiation with respect to price and quality, and entry barriers. Con-
sumers’ selection and firm’s heterogeneity are endogenous in the model. Selection depends on
the changes in the structure of consumer classes and on their preferences; firms’ heterogeneity de-
pends on firms response to price competition (investing in newer and more efficient capital goods
and changing the mark-up) and non-price competition (increasing the quality of their products).
We distinguish two aspects of the norms of competition. First, the lower are entry barriers, the
higher is the probability that new firms enter in one of the consumer goods sectors and com-
pete. Second, the more selective are consumers’ preferences with respect to quality and price, the
strongest the selection of firms, and the lower the number of surviving firms.
Norms of consumption. We model two aspects of changes in consumption behaviour. First,
consumers in different income/working classes consume a different share of goods from each final
good sector in the economy. We assume that less wealthy classes consume mainly basic goods and
smaller shares of luxury goods. The opposite is true for the asymptotically wealthiest class. The
fastest the change in consumption shares between consecutive classes the more heterogeneous
is the demand between income classes at the extremes of the distribution. Second, we model
preferences as the selectivity with respect to prices and quality. We assume that consumers in
classes with a lower income tend to be more selective on price and less selective on quality, with
respect to higher income consumers. These preferences change from one class to the next: the
larger is the change, the larger are the differences between classes.
The three dimensions of the growth regimes are endogenously related in our model. Firm size,
which determine the organisational tiers and wage difference, depends on the level of the demand
and on market concentration. The level of demand depends on the elasticity of the minimum
wage to changes in prices. Market concentration depends on the norms of competition and on
the concentration of the demand. In turn, consumers demand depends on how they are distributed
among classes and on the income of each class, which depends on the organisational tiers and
on the wage differences. In other words, the norms of consumption are partly endogenous to the
wage-labour nexus; the norms of competition are partly endogenous to norms of consumption;
and the wage-labour nexus is partly endogenous to both competitions and consumption norms.
We distinguish two growth regimes. Regime one is characterised by lower differences in com-
pensation across hierarchical tiers, a lower share of profits distributed to managers as bonuses, and
a higher elasticity of the minimum wage to changes in prices and productivity. In other words
regime one assumes a lower personal and functional income inequality. In regime one, market
barriers are lower and consumers are less selective with respect to both price and quality. Finally,
consumption patterns change at a slower pace and the preferences of middle income classes are
closer to those of the lower than to the higher income classes. Such a regime is relatively closer to
what the regulation school defines the Fordist regime.
Regime two is characterised by larger differences in compensation across hierarchical tiers,
a larger share of profits distributed to managers, and a lower elasticity of wages with respect to
changes in prices and productivity. Regime two assumes a higher personal and functional income
inequality. In regime two market barriers are higher and consumers are more selective with respect
to both price and quality. Finally, consumption patterns change at a faster pace and the preferences
of middle income classes are closer to those of the richer than to those of the less wealthy classes.
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Such a regime is relatively closer to what the regulation school defines the post-Fordist regime.
Relevant Literature
To our knowledge, most growth models that discuss growth regimes focus on the long run growth
and on the shifts in growth patterns, such as the unified growth theory (Galor, 2007). For example
due to changes in birth and education household strategies (Galor and Weil, 2000; Boucekkine
et al., 2002), firm growth (Desmet and Parente, 2012), or changes in technology and demand
(Ciarli et al., 2012). Empirically, a number of studies investigate structural breaks in growth
patterns, particularly focusing on developing countries (Kar et al., 2013; Lamperti and Mattei,
2016; Pritchett, 2000). Jones and Olken (2008) characterise the transition between regimes and
find that different countries follow common experience of growth acceleration and declines.
Napoletano et al. (2012) is one of the few papers that attempts to model regimes based on
insights from the regulation school. The authors mainly focus on the relation between income dis-
tribution and firm investment behaviour (in new process technologies). Taking an evolutionary ap-
proach, and focussing on how micro behaviour affect macroeconomic outcomes, they investigate
“how different growth regimes emerge out of micro-interactions between heterogeneous agents”.
The paper discusses two different regimes. One where employment is a consequence of increased
demand through investment, spurred by profit inducing productivity enhancing innovation. A sec-
ond one where investment is not led by profits but by demand expectations, and productivity gains
are shared between capital goods and labour. As a result, an increase in productivity also leads to
increased demand via both consumption and investment.
Our paper is similar in spirit. We model how different ways of organising microeconomic
interactions may lead to different macroeconomic outcomes. We add to the work of Napoletano
et al. (2012) by being more explicit in modelling the labour relations, the forms of competition,
and the norms of consumption, and how differences in those three dimensions may be described as
different regimes, or different forms of capitalism. To our knowledge this is also the first paper that
investigates how structural changes are related to different growth regimes, and how they mediate
the relation between growth and distribution of income under different regimes.
Focusing on the relation between structural changes and growth regimes this paper contributes
substantially to the growing literature on Agent-Based macroeconomics1 and to evolutionary eco-
nomic growth models2. The paper is closely related to papers that study the interaction between
Schumpeterian and Keynesian dynamics using agent based micro foundations (Dosi et al., 2010,
2015, 2013). It is also related to the few multi-sector models that have been offered in this tradi-
tion (Saviotti and Pyka, 2008a,b), and to papers that study skills and labour in relation to income
growth and distribution (Caiani et al., 2016; Dawid et al., 2008; Deissenberg et al., 2008) and more
broadly inequality Cardaci and Saraceno (2015); Dosi et al. (2016); Russo et al. (2016). The paper
further develops the work by Ciarli et al. (2010).3 The model in this paper differs from that of
Ciarli et al. (2010) and Lorentz et al. (2016) substantially: we introduce multiple consumer good
sectors, industrial dynamics, the financial connections linking households savings to investment,
and the focus on medium term growth rather then on the conditions for take-off in the long term.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 describes the aspects of the
model most relevant to the three dimensions of the growth regimes: the wage-labour nexus, the
forms of consumption and the forms of competition. The remaining parts of the model are pre-
1See for example Leijonhufvud (2006); Colander et al. (2008); LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008); Buchanan (2009);
Farmer and Foley (2009); Delli Gatti et al. (2010); Fagiolo and Roventini (2012); Dosi et al. (2013); Lengnick (2013);
Assenza et al. (2015); Dosi et al. (2015); Lorentz (2015); Caiani et al. (2016). See also the recent review in Fagiolo and
Roventini (2017), and other papers in this issue.
2(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005; Cimoli, 1988; Metcalfe et al., 2006; Dosi et al., 1994)
3See Lorentz et al. (2016), and Ciarli and Valente (2016) for earlier extensions.
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sented in appendix A. Section 3 discusses a number of results: the model properties and validation,
the comparison between the two growth regimes, and an assessment of the main institutional and
structural aspects that differentiate the regimes. Section 4 concludes summarising the core results
and discussing policy implications.
2 The Model
The model provides micro foundations for a number of related structural changes: firm organ-
isation, structure of earnings, sector shares, product technology, process technology, consumer
classes, consumption shares, and consumer preferences. The model reflects the principles of
cumulative causation driving economic growth in the lines of Kaldor (1972): the expansion of
effective demand (final demand and induced investments) is the key factor of economic growth,
mediated by changes in technology and other aspects of structural change. We model four sectors:
producers of consumer goods (in turn divided into 10 sectors), producers of capital goods, a finan-
cial sector, and households. The interplay between demand and supply does not lead to market
clearing (Colander et al., 2008; Dosi et al., 2010). In the final good sectors supply is constrained
by firms’ production capacity (time to build capital goods) and labour capacity (hiring). The ex-
pansion of all markets is primarily demand-driven, but the model is circular: demand depends on
households’ available income and preferences, which change with firms’ organisation in all sec-
tors. A system of stocks and backlogs operates as a buffering mechanism coping with short term
differences between supply and demand. Figure 1 plots the real and financial flows between the
four sectors.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
The household sector is populated by workers/consumers. These are divided in different in-
come classes, each with distinct earnings, savings, rents, preferences, and consumption shares.
The income of each class reflects the hierarchical organisation of labour within firms in both the
final and capital good sectors: firms are formed by different layers of workers and executives and
workers/executives in the different layers receive a different compensation. Formally, we refer to
classes of households/workers with the index i ∈ {0,1, . . . ,Λ(t)}. A household is assigned to a
specific class on the basis of the hierarchical position occupied as worker. Λ(t) corresponds to
the highest tier in the largest firm in the economy, determined endogenously on the basis of the
number of its employees. We assume that the labour market is perfectly elastic, thus removing
any population growth constraint. We compute employment using the endogenous vacancy ratio
(Beveridge curve) and the minimum wage via a wage curve.
Firms producing consumer goods populate one of the N final good sectors indexed as n ∈
[1;N], each serving one of the N consumer’s need. The output shares of the final good sectors
therefore depends on the structure of households’ expenditures. Each firm active in the nth sector
is indexed with an index f ∈ {1, . . . ,F(t)}. The f th firm of the nth final good sector is referred to
with the indices (n, f ). Industrial dynamics (entry and exit of firms) determines the number of firms
F(t) in each consumer good sector. A firm competes with other firms in the same consumer good
sector over the quality (q f ,n) and the price (p f ,n) of the produced good. Goods’ quality depends
on firms’ investment in product innovation. The price depends on an endogenously determined
mark-up and on the productivity of the capital stock available, which determines the number of
employees required to produce a given level of output. A firm’s sales depend on the consumption
shares across the N sectors of the household in the different classes and on their relative price and
quality with respect to competitors. In order to produce, a firm f builds and adapts its production
capacity to meet expected demand, inducing investments in capital goods which are supplied by
firms in the capital good sector.
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Firms in the capital good sector produce capital goods with a given level of embodied pro-
ductivity. The embodied productivity improves as a result of firm innovation. For simplicity, we
assume that all capital goods can be used in any consumer good sector. Capital good producers’
sales correspond to the investment of firms in the consumer good sectors. Each firm in the capital
good sector is indexed with an index g ∈ {1, . . . ,G(t)}. For simplicity, we assume no industrial
dynamics in the capital good sector, i.e. there is a constant set of capital good producers.
In all sectors firms labour is organised in hierarchical tiers Simon (1957); Lydall (1959); Rosen
(1982); Caliendo et al. (2015). As we move up the tiers the number of employees reduces, fol-
lowing a pyramidal structure, and the compensations increases exponentially. Based on recent
literature on firm organisation, we assume that workers in one layer have similar occupations, earn
a similar wage (the same in our model). The structure of the layers is based on recent empirical
evidence across a number of countries Caliendo et al. (2015); Ta˚g (2013): average wage increase
with firm size and tiers, tiers are added or remove in consecutive order, and the addition is trig-
gered by reaching a given size. With respect to the empirical evidence we add one assumption
that is crucial to make the connection with the demand side: as noted above, workers in a given
tier are homogeneous not only in terms of occupation and compensation, but also in term of in-
come class and therefore consumption shares and preference. This channel between occupation
and consumption has received some attention (Mazzolari and Ragusa, 2013) and would definitely
benefit from further research.
The financial sector is a centralised institution mediating between households, supplying liq-
uidity through their savings, and firms in need of liquidity to fund their investments in new capital
goods or to cover losses. In return, the financial sector collects profits from firms and redistributes
them to households in the form of dividends. From the household’s perspective, savings are used
to buy financial assets issued by the financial sector, which grant the right to a share of future
firms’ profits. Hence, the share of the total number of financial assets owned by a households’
class, determines the share of profits distributed to that class by firms in the form of dividends.
The number and price of financial assets owned by a class depends on the cumulated level of past
savings. The total value of the financial sector is given by the liquidity collected through savings
and not (yet) lent to firms, and the debt cumulated by active firms in order to purchase capital
goods or to cover losses. This value, divided by the total number of financial assets issued in the
past, determines the current price of financial assets.
The model makes a number of simplifying assumptions. We abstract from redistributive or
any other fiscal policy, and focus on the structural determinants of inequality. We focus only
on incremental innovations, which in the medium run are more relevant to growth than radical
innovations Garcia-Macia et al. (2015). For simplicity we do not consider the role of skills, and
how they might be related to the hierarchical tiers and wages. We also simplify the labour market,
by assuming an infinite supply of labour and modelling unemployment at the macro level. For
simplicity we also do not consider dimensions that are related to the growth regimes such as the
substantial differences in the international division of labour, macroeconomic policies, financial
markets, and trade. All these limitations are great opportunities for future work.
We describe how we model each of the three dimensions of the growth regimes in Sections 2.1
(wage-labour nexus), 2.2 (norms of consumption), and 2.3 (norms of competition). The remaining
components of the model, indirectly related to the regimes, are presented in Appendix A.
2.1 The Wage-Labour Nexus
In our model we distinguish three main aspects of the wage labour nexus: the wage differences
between occupations along a firm hierarchy, i.e. the compensations of workers and different levels
of executives – including bonuses; the distribution of profits as dividends on the financial market
resulting from the functional distribution of earning within the firms and the saving behaviour
of households; and the elasticity of the minimum wage with respect to changes in productivity
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and prices, shaping the distribution of productivity gains between wages and profits, and workers’
purchasing power.
2.1.1 The Wage Structure
Each worker/consumer in class i has a disposable income Di(t) composed of wages Wi(t), bonuses
(from profits) Ψi(t), and the dividends on firms’ profits Ei(t):
Di(t) =Wi(t)+Ψi(t)+Ei(t) , ∀i ∈ {0;1;2; ...;Λ(t)} (1)
The total wage of a class i is the sum of the wages paid by all firms, in the consumer good
sectors and the capital good sector, to the employees in the corresponding organisational tier (by
assumption each class corresponds to a tier of workers/executives):
Wi(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
wi,n, f (t)Li,n, f (t)+
G(t)
∑
g=1
wi,g(t)Li,g(t) (2)
Where wi,n, f (t) is the wage paid to workers in the i’s tier by firm f in consumer good sector n at
time t; Li,n, f (t) the amount of labour employed by firm f in tier i at time t; wi,g(t) the wage rate
paid to workers in the i’s tier by firm g in the capital good sector at time t; Li,g(t) the amount of
labour employed by firm g in tier i at time t.
Li,n, f (t), the total amount of workers of a tier i employed by firm f in a final good sector n at
time t is a function of the firm’s planned level of output Qdn, f (t). Given Q
d
n, f (t) firms hire a number
of shop floor workers L1 f (t) that depends on productivity An, f (t − 1) and on a share υ of extra
labour capacity to face unexpected increases in final demand:
L1,n, f (t) = εL1,n, f (t−1)+(1− ε)
[
(1+υ)
1
An, f (t−1)min{Q
d
n, f (t); B¯Kn, f (t−1)}
]
(3)
where ε is a measure of labour market rigidities allowing firms to reach the desired level of workers
only asymptotically over time and 1B¯ is a constant capital stock intensity. ε is set to a value which
generates unfilled vacancies corresponding to empirical evidence.
Similarly, the number of workers employed by firm g in tier i at time t in the capital good
sector is a function of the planned output (Kdg (t)) and of a share υg of extra labour capacity:
L1,g(t) = (1+υg)Kdg (t) (4)
Firms in all sectors also hire ‘executives’. For every ν shop-floor workers the firm hires one
executive at the second tier. For every ν second tier executives one third level executives is hired,
and so on. Following Simon (1957), the number of workers in each tier i, for any firm k ∈ { f ,g},
given L1, f (t) is:4
L2,k(t) = ν−1L1,k(t)
...
Li,k(t) = ν1−iL1,k(t)
...
LΛk(t),k(t) = ν
1−Λk(t)L1,k(t)
(5)
where Λk(t) is the total number of tiers required to manage firm k at time t.5 We assume a fully
elastic labour supply and derive unemployment and minimum wage in Section 2.1.3.
4The index for sector n is suppressed because we represent both final good sectors and the capital good sector.
5Caiani et al. (2016) propose an interesting simplified static version of the firm hierarchical structure, introducing
heterogeneous wages within each tier. For simplicity in our model we assume that all workers in a given level earn the
same wage.
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The wage paid to the workers reflects the hierarchical structure of the labour force within
the firm. The wage of the shop-floor worker w1,k(t) is an ω multiplier of the minimum wage
wmin(t−1). The wage of the immediate next tier of executives is a multiple b of w1,k(t); the wage
of the immediate next tier of executives is a multiple b of w2,k(t); and so on. b determines the
skewness in the wage distribution in line with Simon (1957) and Lydall (1959):
w1,k(t) = ω ∗wmin(t−1)
...
wi,k(t) = bi−1 ∗ω ∗wmin(t−1)
...
wΛk(t),k(t) = b
Λk(t)−1 ∗ω ∗wmin(t−1)
(6)
2.1.2 Profit Shares and Financial Returns
The total amount of bonuses of a class i > 1 is the sum of the share of profits redistributed by firms
to the corresponding tier:
Ψi(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
ψi,n, f (t)+
G
∑
g=1
(t)ψi,g(t) , ∀i ∈ {2; ...;Λ(t)} (7)
Whereψi,n, f (t) andψi,n, f (t) are, respectively, the bonuses distributed by the firm f in the consumer
sector n and by the firm g in the capital good sector to the tier of worker i > 1 at time t.
Firms in the final good and capital good sectors (k ∈ { f ,g}) distribute a ratio pi of their profits
Πk(t) as wage premia to executives:6
Ψk(t) = piΠk(t) (8)
These are assumed to be distributed proportionally to executives’ wage (i ∈ {2; ..;Λk(t)}).7 The
share ψi,k(t) of redistributed profits to the executives of each tier i is computed as
ψi,k(t) =

wi,k(t−1)
∑
Λk(t)
i=2 wi,k(t−1)
Ψk(t)
0 ; for i = 1
(9)
The savings that are used by firms in the form of loans are repaid to consumers in the form
of dividends. The returns on savings of a class i is a share of the sum of dividends distributed by
all the firms (R(t)) proportional to the share of financial assets owned by the class in the previous
period (Ui(t−1)):
Ei(t) = R(t)∗ Ui(t−1)
∑Λ(t)j=1 U j(t−1)
, ∀i ∈ {0;1; ...;Λ(t)} (10)
where R(t) corresponds to the sum of firms’ profits in the final good sectors and the capital good
sector net of the wage bonuses and the R&D expenses. The saving behaviour of each consumer
class is formally described in Section A.2.1.
6The index for sector n is suppressed because we represent both final good sectors and the capital good sector.
7The aim of this paper is not to explain the rise in executives’ compensation. However, the proposed wage and bonus
structure conforms the model to a stylised representation of the evidence on firms’ compensation structure, and on the
recent increase in executive’s pay. Some evidence suggest that the rise in CEO pay is mainly linked to stock options
(Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Other evidence suggests that the main component of the increase in income of the top 1%
are salaries and bonuses (Atkinson et al., 2011). The crucial aspect tat we highlight here is the exponential increase
in wages with an organisation’s tiers, and the use of profits to amplify this difference. Dividends, which may also be
though as stock options, also augment the income of the wealthiest classes relative to the less wealthy, as discussed
below. Whether they come from savings or from firm compensation is not crucial in this model.
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As a consequence of the saving behaviour, the wealthier is a class, the higher the proportion
of income saved and used to purchase financial assets. Cœteris paribus, the share of per capita
income from dividends increases by income class, proportional to wage differences.
2.1.3 Minimum Wage Dynamics
The third component of the wage-labour nexus, the minimum wage, is a function of unemploy-
ment, average productivity, and inflation. We peg changes in the minimum wage to changes in
productivity and prices. The larger the elasticity of the minimum wage to productivity and infla-
tion, the higher the distribution of value to workers, and the higher the purchasing power.
The minimum wage wm(t) is the lowest wage that firms can offer to shop-floor workers. Fol-
lowing evidence on the wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2006; Nijkamp and Poot, 2005)
the minimum wage changes proportionally to the changes in the rate of unemployment u(t), for
a given level of productivity and price index. Following empirical evidence on wage negotiations
(Boeri, 2012) we assume that the wage curve shifts upwards for given changes in consumer prices
(4P(t))8 or productivity (4A(t)).9
We assume that negotiations to increase the minimum wage take place whenever consumer
prices (P(t)) or productivity (A(t)) increase by at least, respectively, a factor ΩP or ΩA since the
last negotiations (t = τw). Hence, for a stable unemployment rate, the minimum wages grows
proportionally to labour productivity and/or prices. More formally:
wm(t) = wm(t−1)+ εU [u(t−1)−u(t)]+wm(τw)[εP(t)4P(t)+ εA(t)4A(t)] (11)
where εU is the elasticity with respect to changes in the rate of unemployment, εP(t) and εA(t) are,
respectively, the elasticities with respect to changes in the consumer price and labour productivity.
εP(t) and εA(t) vary depending on the growth of P(t) and A(t) as follows:
εP(t) =

0 if4P(t)≤ΩP4P(τw)
εP if4P(t)>ΩP4P(τw) and4A(t)≤ΩA4A(τw)
0.5∗ εP if4P(t)>ΩP4P(τw) and4A(t)>ΩA4A(τw)
εA(t) =

0 if4A(t)≤ΩA4A(τw)
εA if4A(t)>ΩA4A(τw) and4P(t)≤ΩP4P(τw)
0.5∗ εA if4A(t)>ΩA4A(τw) and4P(t)>ΩP4P(τw)
(12)
If the increase in either P(t) or A(t) from one time period to the next is small, the minimum
wage depends only on the level of unemployment. If either P(t) or A(t) increases by ΩP or ΩA
since t = τw, the minimum wage increases by an amount proportional to the increase in P(t) or
8P(t) is the weighted average of the final good firms’ prices:
P(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
Y f (t)
∑Nn=1∑
F(t)
f=1 Y f (t)
p f (t−1)
9Aggregate productivity is the ratio between aggregate output and employment:
A(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
Yn, f (t)
∑Nn=1∑
F(t)
f=1 Yn, f (t)
An, f (t−1)
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A(t), irrespective of unemployment. If both P(t) and A(t) increase by ΩP or ΩA since t = τw,
the minimum wage increases by an amount proportional to half the increase in P(t) and half the
increase in A(t).
We estimate the level of unemployment (u(t)) using the well established Beveridge Curve, as
explained in Appendix A.1.1.
How do we distinguish the two growth regimes with respect to the wage-labour nexus? regime
one is characterised by lower differences in compensation across organisational tiers (lower b), a
lower share of profits redistributed to executives (lower pi) and a higher elasticity of the minimum
wage to an increase in productivity and/or prices (higher εP(t) and εA(t)). The other way round
for regime two. These differences are summarised in Table 2. Note that in our model there is
no Government, and therefore no redistribution of wealth between classes. In other words, the
distribution of income in our model is assumed to depend only on the economic structure (which
also depends on institutions).
[TABLE 2 HERE]
2.2 Norms of Consumption
We distinguish two aspects of consumer behaviour, which are endogenous to the wage-labour
nexus: the pace at which as new and wealthier income classes emerge they change the distribution
of their purchases from basic to luxury goods – across the N sectors; and the pace at which, as new
and wealthier income classes emerge, their preference – with respect to price and quality – differ
with respect to the immediately less wealthy class.
2.2.1 Expenditure Shares
The disposable income Di(t) (Eq 1) is spent on goods from all N sectors or saved in the central
financial institution. In line with the evidence on consumption smoothing we assume that the level
of expenditure is a convex combination of the non-saved share of the current level of income Di(t)
and of the past level of expenditure (Xi(t−1)):
Xi(t) = γXi(t−1)+(1− γ)(1− si)Di(t) (13)
where γ ∈ [0;1] is the rate of consumption smoothing and si ∈ [0;1] is the given class’s’ i saving
rate.10.
Consumers from a class i allocate a share cn,i of expenditures to each final good sector. The
sector consumption level for each consumer class is then computed as:
Ci,n(t) = ci,nXi(t) with ci,n ∈ [0;1] ;
N
∑
n=1
ci,n = 1 ∀i (14)
Following the literature on the distribution of expenditures shares and the evidence on Engel curves
(Barigozzi and Moneta, 2016; Moneta and Chai, 2013), we assume that expenditure shares (cn,i)
vary with income. Less wealthy classes tend to consume more basic goods, and more wealthy
classes tend to consume more luxury goods. Let us consider the asymptotic distribution of con-
sumption shares for the wealthiest possible class: c¯n. As we move from the first class towards the
asymptotic class, we model the change in expenditure shares logistically:
ci,n = ci−1,n (1−η (ci−1,n− c¯n)) (15)
where η is the speed of convergence to c¯n, i.e. the pace at which wealthier classes change con-
sumption shares towards more luxury goods.11
10The actual savings can differ from the desired share in case of sudden changes in income: accumulated when
income increases and used when income reduces.
11See for example Verspagen (1993) and Lorentz (2015).
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2.2.2 Consumer Preferences
We model bounded rational consumption behaviour inspired by the literature on experimental
psychology (Gigerenzer, 1997; Gigerenzer and Selten, eds, 2001), and implemented in Valente
(2012).
Consumers do not have full information on the quality and price of goods.12 They make
a selection on goods based on a perceived value of quality and price drawn from a normally
distributed random function centred on the true values ad with variance ι .
For each sector n consumers first select a subset of firms with probability proportional to their
visibility υˆ f (t).13 Next, consumers rank the available alternatives according to the perceived level
of price and quality. Consumers then select a subset of goods with a quality above, and a price
below, a selectivity threshold: respectively λq,i and λp,i. The selectivity thresholds defines the
maximum distance between the price and the quality of a good produced by firm { f ,n} and the
minimum price and maximum quality available in the same sector and period. The preferences are
therefore defined in terms of the selectivity with respect to the best option. We assume that higher
income classes are less selective with respect to deviations from the lowest prices (they are ready
to buy more expensive goods), and that they are more selective with respect to deviations from
the highest quality (they are not ready to buy goods of lower quality). Conversely, we assume that
lower income classes are more selective with respect to price and less selective with respect to
quality. More formally, the selectivity parameter with respect to price λp,i decreases with income
classes, and the selective parameter with respect to quality λq,i increases with income classes:
λp,i = (1−ηλ )λp,i−1+ηλλmin (16)
λq,i = (1−ηλ )λq,i−1+ηλλmax (17)
where λmin and λmax are the asymptotic values of selectivity, as well as the selectivity of the least
wealthy class (λmin = λq,1, λmax = λp,1); ηλ is the speed at which preferences change with income
classes. The smaller is the difference between λmin and λmax, and the lower ηλ , the smaller is
the differences between classes in terms of preferences. For a large ηλ households have a large
ambition to keep up with the Jones.
How do we distinguish the two growth regimes with respect to the norms of consumption?
Regime one is characterised by a relatively lower consumption of luxury goods cœeteris paribus,
i.e. irrespective of classes’ income. In other words, firms tend to concentrate on fewer sector, and
the demand for niche goods is relatively low. Accordingly, regime one is also characterised by a
lower rate of change of consumption preferences as new classes emerge and consumers tend to be
more selective on price, on average, than on quality. These differences are summarised in Table 3.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
2.3 Competition and Market Concentration
We consider two aspects of the norms of competition distinguishing economic regimes. The first is
exogenously defined as barriers to the entry of new firms. The second is endogenous to consumer
behaviour: firms selection.
2.3.1 Industrial Dynamics
The number of firms F(t) active in each sector at time t results from the interplay between a
stochastic entry and an endogenous exit mechanism based on firms’ performance.
12See for example Celsi and Olson (1988); Hoch and Ha (1986); Rao and Monroe (1989); Zeithaml (1988) and
Rotemberg (2008).
13See equation 41.
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Firms in the final good sectors exit when their estimated return on capital falls below a given
threshold ξ . A firm’s f return on capital is computed as the ratio between a firm’ profits’ moving
average (Πˆ f (t))14 and the value of its assets (Kˆ f (t)):
RoK f (t) =
Πˆ f (t)
Kˆ f (t)
(18)
The value of the assets used to compute a firm’s RoK f (t) consists of the cumulated loans
received from the financial sector since birth, either to purchase new capital goods Jkf ( j) or to
cover losses (Jlf ( j)):
Kˆ f (t) =
t
∑
j=t f
[Jkf ( j)+ J
l
f ( j)] (19)
where j is the time period the loan was received. The model assumes that the money borrowed
from the financial sector are never repaid because households, through the intermediation of the fi-
nancial sector, effectively become shareholders of the firms. Firm’s profits not invested in R&D or
used to pay bonuses are returned to the financial sector to be distributed to consumers as dividends.
At each time step a new firm enters in each final good sector with a probability ϑ . New
firms are assumed to produce a good with the same quality of the firm with the best quality in the
sector. They are given a loan equal to 10% of the sum of the net worth of all firms in the sector
to purchase a capital good of the latest vintage. Each firm is assumed to have a level of visibility
which conditions the probability of being selected by consumers. We assume that new firms have
low visibility (0.1),15 and therefore initially serve a niche demand.
2.3.2 Firm’s Selection: Price and Quality
Firms compete on price and quality. Which strategy is most effective depends on the composition
of the demand, which in our model depends on the distribution of earnings, bonuses, and dividends
(the wage-labour nexus), and on the changes in consumption shares and preferences (norms of
consumption).
Firms in the final good sector charge a mark-up m f (t) on unitary production costs:
p f (t) = (1+m f (t))
ω ∗wmin(t−1)∑Λ f (t)i=1 bi−1ν1−i
A f (t−1) (20)
As firms grow they invest in new capital vintages of higher productivity (on average),16 which
reduces the labour cost, and hire new labour, which increases the labour costs due to the increase
in the number and levels of executives.17
The mark-up increases when demand exceeds a firm’s production capacity and reduces when
inventories exceed its desired ratio. Formally, the mark-up mechanisms can be described as fol-
lows:
m f (t) =

m¯+µ log
(
1+
Y ef (t)+I f (t)
Q f (t)
)
; for I f (t)< 0 | Y ef (t)> 0 | Q f (t)> 0
m¯ ; for I f (t)≥ 0 | Y ef (t)> 0 | Q f (t)> 0
(21)
where m¯ is a minimum mark-up; µ is a coefficient of variation that determines how much mark-up
can adjust in the short period; Y ef (t) represents the expected sales of the firm; Q f (t) its current
production level; and I f (t) its current inventories.
14Πˆ f (t) = ˆΠ f (t−1)a+(1−a)Π f (t).
15See equation 41.
16See Appendix A.3.3.
17Labour costs are computed are computed only with respect to the shop-floor workers.
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Changes in a firm’s good quality (qn, f (t)) result from product innovation. In each period final
good firms spend a fixed share ρ of the moving average of expected sales in R&D: RD f (t) =
ρY¯ ef (t). As a result a firm has a proportional number of innovation trials, which increases at a
decreasing rate to acknowledge for both Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II innovative
behaviour (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995) – cœteris paribus a new firm has a higher probability of
benefiting from an innovation, but larger firms innovate more: RTf (t) = log(1+RD f (t)).
The probability of success for a given trial is assumed to be fixed, χ , and uniformly distributed
across trials/firms. For a successful trial18, the quality of the new product is normally distributed:
qef (t)∼ N(q f (t−1);q f (t−1)∗σq) (22)
where σq is fixed. The new product replaces the current one if its quality is higher:
q f (t) = max{q f (t−1);qef (t)} (23)
How do we distinguish the two growth regimes with respect to the norms of competition?
On the one hand regime one is characterised by a relatively higher probability of entry, therefore
more opportunities and lower barriers, cœteris paribus. On the other hand, in regime one the least
wealthy consumers selectivity with respect to price is lower. That is, for each sector, the most se-
lective consumers with respect to price (the least wealthy class) purchases goods from a relatively
larger set of firms with different prices; and the difference with respect the most wealthy class
(with a very low selectivity with respect to price) is smaller. These differences are summarised in
Table 4.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
3 Simulation Results
We investigate computationally the results of the model with respect to aggregate output, income
distribution, and their relation for two growth regimes that differ with respect to labour relations,
competition, and consumption. For each parametrisation we run the model several times and
analyse the resulting average and across runs standard deviation.19
Before studying the two regimes, we discuss the properties of the model and its robustness with
respect to several stylised facts. We employ a “benchmark” parametrisation of the model relying
on empirically calibrated values for all parameters for which we could find empirical evidence.20
Table 1 in Appendix C provides full detail of the parameters’ initialisation. The “benchmark”
parameter values are also the average between the values in the two regimes. The model was
implemented and studied in the open source software Laboratory for Simulation Development.
3.1 Model Properties and Empirical Validation
Our model is equipped to study the evolution of an economy through different phases of economic
development, including long term stagnation and economic take off.21 Because in this paper we
are interested in studying regimes characterising modern capitalistic systems, we run the model
until a modern economy emerges, after take off – an emergent property of the model related to
18If successful, no more trials are used in that period, and the firm must wait Ξ periods before the next investment in
R&D.
19100 runs when investigating the model properties and empirical validation and 25 runs when investigating the
regimes.
20For some of the behavioural parameters unfortunately we could not find any evidence and we had to rely on
qualitative evidence.
21See for example the literature on unified growth theory (Galor, 2010; Desmet and Parente, 2012).
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several structural changes (Ciarli et al., 2010, 2012). As part of the economy take-off firms grow
in size and adopt complex organisational structures; new consumer classes emerge, that purchase
relatively larger ratios of luxury goods; lower income classes consumption basket changes as an
outcome of imitation; productivity growth accompanies population growth; sectors become more
concentrated; and inequality increases.
We then initialise the model from this stage, using parameters values observed in modern
economies (Table 1). We let the model run for 250 time periods to eliminate from the analysis the
noise of the initial adjustments, and we analyse the model for the following 1000 time periods.22
The level of detail of the agents’ micro behaviour in our model suggests that each time period is
equivalent to approximately a fortnight.
The model exhibits endogenous exponential growth of output, accompanied by growth of
consumption, investment (Figure 2a) and aggregate labour productivity (Figure 2b). The main
aggregate drivers of the endogenous growth are demand and productivity enhancing technological
change (more on this in the next Section).
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Technological change in the capital good sector increases the productivity of capital vintages
purchased by incumbents and new firms, which has two main effects: replacing labour, which
reduces demand in the short term; reducing relative prices and increasing relative wages, which
increases demand and output in the medium term.
The model reproduces a large number of empirical regularities at the macro, meso and microe-
conomic level. These are summarised in Table 5 and discussed in Appendix F.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
3.2 Growth Regimes, Income Distribution and Economic Growth
Inspired by the analysis of the regulation theory (Coriat and Dosi, 2000) we distinguish two differ-
ent regimes with respect to the following three dimensions:23 the wage labour nexus, competition
and market concentration, and norms of consumption.
With respect to the first dimension (wage labour nexus), the two regimes differ in terms of the
wage variation along the firm hierarchical organisation (b in equation 6), the size of bonuses and
wage premia distributed to managers according to their hierarchical position (pi in equation 8), and
the purchasing power of the least wealthy class, as a result of changes in the minimum wage with
respect to productivity (εA in equation 11) and prices (εP in equation 11).
With respect to the second dimension, the two regimes differ in terms of entry barriers to new
firms in all sectors (ϑ in Section 2.3.1) and the selectivity of consumers of the first class (least
wealthy) with respect to price (λp,1 in equation 17) and quality (λq,1 in equation 17).
With respect to the third dimension, the two regimes differ in terms of the speed at which
consumption shares change between income classes (η in equation 15) and in terms of weather
middle income class consumer preferences are closer to the wealthiest consumers – more (less)
selective on quality (price), or to the least wealthy consumers (ηλ in equation 17) – less (more)
selective on quality (price).
22The adjustment is due to small differences in consumer preferences, productivity, and the adjustments of the labour
market, introduced to reflect parameter values that are closer to those observed in a modern system with respect to those
observed in a pre take-off economy: the first class of wage earners are less selective with respect to price; innovation
efforts are more successful, and wages follow more closely changes in prices and in productivity. These changes cause
an initial minor downturn in the economy as prices, firms’ market shares and concentration (exit and entry) adjust to
the new system.
23The regulation theory discusses two more relevant dimensions: finance and the role of the state. Both are crucial,
but for the sake of clarity we leave the analysis of these other dimensions to further research.
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Table 6 reports these dimensions of the two different regimes, with reference to the model’s
parameters.
We define Regime one in resemblance to what the regulation theory qualifies as Fordist with
relatively lower differences in wages and profit shares, and relatively higher wage elasticity with
respect to productivity and inflation; higher entry and competition; and relatively less differen-
tiated consumption patterns, but relatively more similar preferences between the middle and the
top classes. We define Regime two in resemblance to what the regulation theory qualifies as Post-
Fordist: larger differences in wages, higher profit shares, and lower minimum wage elasticity with
respect to productivity and inflation; lower entry and competition; and relatively more differenti-
ated consumption patterns, but relatively more similar preferences between the low and the middle
classes. Table 6 reports the initial conditions of the two different regimes, with reference to the
model’s parameters.
[TABLE 6 HERE]
We employ the model to study how the two regimes differ in terms of output and income
distribution, and to which extent the differences are related to different dimensions of structural
change. Table 7 reports the mean values over 25 independent runs with different pseudo random
seeds for each regime – and the t-statistics and p-values for the mean difference test between
the two regimes, for a selected number of macroeconomic indices: output, income distribution,
employment, productivity, and different indices for the structure of production, consumption, and
earnings. Each value is the average over 2000 steps.
[TABLE 7 HERE]
The two regimes differ significantly with respect to output level, unemployment rate, and
inequality (measured using the Atkinson index).24 Regime one experiences higher output, lower
inequality, and to some extent also lower unemployment.
To investigate the extent of the relation between economic growth and inequality we estimate
the correlation between the Atkinson index and real output using a LAD estimator for the average
values computed over each simulation run. Table 8 shows that, although in both regimes inequality
is positively related to real output,25 the relation is significantly stronger in regime two. In a regime
with larger wage differences, lower distribution of productivity gains to wages, lower competition,
and more skewed consumption patterns, productivity gains are more unevenly distributed among
workers.
[TABLE 8 HERE]
3.2.1 Institutional Components of Income Distribution and Economic Growth
The differences in the distributive outcomes can be traced down to four related institutional compo-
nents in our model. First, higher inequality in regime two is a direct consequence of the difference
in the wage multiplier between tiers of workers (b), which is lower in regime one (Table 6). The
wage-income ratio26 measures the share of wage earnings in the households total income. For both
regimes, wages correspond to the largest component of income (Table 7). As a consequence, the
wage settings account for a large part of the income inequality differences among the two regimes.
The second component of the difference in inequality is the minimum wage. While regime
two has a higher average level of household income, the minimum wage is significantly lower
24See equation 59 in appendix B.
25As noted, in our model we do not consider any redistributive mechanism. We study income distribution as an
outcome of the structure of production and demand
26See equation B in appendix B.
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(Table 7). The higher average household income in regime two is accompanied by a lower wage
of the first tiers of workers, the least wealthy households.
The third component of the difference in inequality is due to dividends (the functional distribu-
tion of income). The share of dividends on total household income, as measured by the dividends-
income ratio27, in regime two is significantly higher than in regime one (Table 7). Moreover, firms
in regime two make a significantly higher level of (total) profits than the firms in the regime one
(Table 7). As the higher tiers of workers have a higher saving rate, the profits redistributed to the
corresponding wealthier classes as dividends are also higher in regime two. However, the domi-
nating weight of wages in total income limits the actual contribution of dividends to inequality.
Fourth, the differences in the industrial structure between regimes magnify the differences
in the structure of earnings. As measured by the inverse Herfindhal index in sales,28 the final
good sector in regime one is significantly less concentrated than in regime two (Table 7). Market
concentration tends to increase income inequality:29 larger firms require more organisational tiers,
and therefore higher wage differences between the bottom and the top tiers; they also make higher
profits, redistributed through premia and dividends to the wealthiest income classes. The lower
market concentration in regime one is driven by two distinct mechanisms. The first one is a direct
consequence of the regimes setting: a higher probability of firm entry and less selective consumers
in regime one, by assumption (Table 6), imply a higher degree of competition. The second and
more interesting one is an emerging property of the model: the most concentrated sectors are those
producing luxury goods, representing the main consumption shares of top income classes, whereas
basic good sectors that represent the highest shares of consumption of the least wealthy classes
(e.g. food, housing, and power) are significantly less concentrated (more on this below).
We study the relative influence of these four components by comparing the Atkinson index
for different combinations of parameters ranging between the values of the two regimes, cœteris
paribus.30 Tables 10 to 11 report the results of t-test for mean values of the Atkinson index across
2000 simulation steps for 20 replications.
Table 9 reports the combined effect of the wage multiplier and the elasticity of the minimum
wage to productivity and consumer price on inequality with respect to the benchmark case (b =
1.6, εA = εP = 1). Increasing the tier-multiplier for wages (increasing b) in our model significantly
increases the wage inequality among workers, as expected. However, the elasticity of the minimum
wage (εA and εP) alone does not have a significant effect on inequality, in our model, not even
when combined with a higher wage multiplier.
[TABLE 9 HERE]
Table 10 reports the combined effect on inequality of the wage multiplier with the share of
profits redistributed as premia, with respect to the benchmark case (b = 1.6 and pi = 0.15). Both
parameters affect mechanically the individual and functional income distribution: increasing the
share of profits (higher pi) redistributed as premia significantly increases the level of inequality,
magnifying the effect that a higher wage multiplier has on inequality. Because the distribution
of premia is proportional to wage in our model, higher wage differences imply higher premia
differences, reinforcing income inequality.
[TABLE 10 HERE]
We next focus on the effect of the parameters defining the nature of competition, and therefore
concentration: the joint effect of consumer’s selectivity – which tends to reduce the number of
27See equation B in appendix B.
28See equation 62 in appendix
29See also Ciarli et al. (2010) and Ciarli and Valente (2016).
30Where by cœteris paribus we mean the benchmark configuration (Table 7).
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firms fit to compete, and of the probability of firm entry, with respect to inequality. Table 11 shows
the effect of competition on inequality with respect to the intermediate case (ϑ = 0.08,λp,1 =
¯0.825,λq,1 = ¯0.175). Cœteris paribus, increased competition in all sectors (higher ϑ ) reduces
market concentration.31 In turn, an equal reduction of market concentration in all sectors tends to
decrease the relative size of firm: the same output is produced by a larger number of smaller firms.
As a result, there are fewer managers with large salaries, lower profits distributed as dividends, as
well as a lower savings and capital gains.
[TABLE 11 HERE]
Selection has the opposite effect. The increased concentration due to higher consumer selec-
tivity (higher λp,1) reduces income inequality. This is due to two main emergent properties in our
model.
First, the most concentrated sectors are those in which the least wealthy classes have the lowest
consumption shares.32 This in turn is due to two main features in our model. On the one hand,
price strategy is more flexible than innovation strategy: firms can change their prices and follow
consumer price preferences more quickly than innovate and improve the quality of their good. In
other words, firms can more easily escape selective pressure from the large amount of consumers
that prefer less expensive goods, but struggle to excel in quality and capture the demand of the
consumers that prefer high quality goods. On the other hand, mass consumption exerts a strong
pressure even on large firms, which in the short period will accumulate large backlogs – as they
wait for the new capital goods – and deviate consumer demand towards competitors, even if their
price is higher.33 In other words, time-to-build capital creates more competition among consumer
good firms.
Second, increased price selectivity induces small changes in employment shares out-migrating
from sectors which constitute the highest shares of less wealthy consumers. Despite being the least
concentrated, these are the sectors with the largest incumbents, cumulated revenues, and profits.
The changes in employment shares then have the small but significant negative effect on inequality
observed in table 11, despite the overall increase in concentration due to stronger market selection.
When we compare the relative effect of each parameter on income inequality with respect to
the differences between the two regimes (Table 7), it turns out that the first component (inflated by
the third component of dividends, which are proportional to wages) represents the lion’s share. A
larger distribution of bonuses increases the relevance of wage differences even further.
Market competition alone plays an ambiguous role, depending on whether it comes from lower
barrier to entry (which reduces inequality) or weaker consumer selection (which in our model
increases inequality).
Finally, changes in the minimum wage, alone, do not seem to play a significant role.
However, it is important to acknowledge that in a model with so many non linear relations, such
as the one presented in this paper, the composite effect of several parameters (the two regimes) is
not equal to the sum of the effects of the single parameters.
The higher inequality in regime two is accompanied by a significantly lower level of real output
and labour productivity, and a significantly higher unemployment rate. Tables 10 to 11 report the
results of t-test for mean values of the output across 2000 simulation steps for 20 replications for
the parameters defining the two regimes.
Except for a few parametrisations, increasing the wage multiplier (higher b) significantly limits
output growth (Table 12). Similarly, increasing the share of profits redistributed as premia (higher
pi) also has a negative effect on output. Both parameters seem to hinder growth as they increase
inequality.
31See the effect of selectivity and entry probability on market concentration in the appendix table 20.
32Results not shown here are available from the authors.
33Note that firms with high backlogs in our more also have an incentive to increase the mark-up.
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Third, reducing the elasticity of minimum wages to prices and productivity (lower εA and εP)
has a negative effect on output only below a threshold, which in our model is 0.75 (Table 13).
This negative effect is independent from changes in income distribution. This is a purely demand
driven effect: increases in prices and productivity that are not reflected in an increase in the level
of all wages tend to depress demand.
Fourth, the competition parameters also have a different effect on output with respect to in-
come distribution (Table 14). On the one hand, alongside income inequality a higher probability of
entry (higher ϑ ) also significantly increases output. On the other hand, stronger market selection
(higher λp,1), although it reduces inequality, does not have a significant impact on real output.
[TABLE 12 HERE]
[TABLE 13 HERE]
[TABLE 14 HERE]
Comparing the relative effect of each parameter on real output with respect to the overall
difference between the two regimes (Table 7) we find that: wage differences can account for large
differences in output, but not the overall difference that we observe between the two regimes.
When combined with the share of profit redistributed as bonuses, the cœteris paribus differences
in output are very similar to those observed between the two regimes.
The elasticity of the minimum age accounts for a small fraction of difference between regimes,
even when combined with differences in the wage coefficient.
Entry barriers, cœteris paribus, also account for a large share of the differences between the
regimes, especially in the case of lower barriers, but selection almost leave output unchanged
3.2.2 Structural Change, Income Distribution and Economic Growth
As we argue in this section, some of the differences in output and income distribution resulting
from the two different institutional settings are rooted in the structure of production and consump-
tion.
First, in our model an increase in demand and output can be satisfied by new entrants or by
growing incumbents. As firms grow, higher hierarchical tiers are required. These higher tiers of
workers correspond to higher income classes. The sheer emergence of large firms then explain
part of the raising inequality. As discussed, the modes of competition that distinguish our two
regimes fine tune the extent to which output growth is concentrated.
Whereas supply side concentration has a direct impact on income distribution, concentration
of demand also plays a significant role in explaining the two regimes.
As noted, the aggregate level of concentration hides significant differences between sectors.
However, concentration is significantly negatively related to the expenditure shares of the least
wealthy income classes: the higher the demand from low income classes, the lower the concen-
tration. Consumption shares of income classes above the first one, though, change between the
two regimes, as the rate of change of expenditure shares increase from regime one to regime two.
As the demand shifts more rapidly to luxury goods, more employment should concentrate in sec-
tors that tend to be more concentrated, increasing the overall concentration of production. This
effect may be counterbalanced by changes of preferences that reduce price selectivity and increase
quality selectivity, which on average reduce the competitive pressure on firms.
Third, the structure of demand influences competition. Sectors serving high shares of the less
wealthy consumers expenditures, experience a significantly higher demand, from consumers that
are very selective with respect to price. Given the pyramidal structure of firms and society, these
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classes represent the large majority of consumers.34 As a result, sectors representing high shares
of the less wealthy consumers expenditures are significantly more competitive, and firms tend
to charge a lower mark-up, than in less competitive sectors. Profits are also remarkably lower.
Therefore, a faster increase in the expenditure shares of luxury goods, as in regime two, should
imply higher inequality (and lower output growth).
We test how differences in the modes of consumption affect output, cœteris paribus. Whether
a larger heterogeneity of expenditure shares (η) and preferences (ηλ ) has a positive or negative
effective on output and inequality. Table 15 reports the difference in output for different rates of
change in expenditure shares (η) and consumer preferences (ηλ ) ranging between the values of the
two regimes, cœteris paribus. Table 15 also reports the results of t-test for mean values of output
across 2000 simulation steps for 20 replications. Moving from lower to higher heterogeneity in
expenditures shares or preferences, alone, has no significant effect on real output (although the
direction of the change is as expected).
[TABLE 15 HERE]
We run the same analysis for inequality outcomes (Table 16), and also find no significant effect
of the heterogeneity of consumption shares or consumer preferences.
[TABLE 16 HERE]
Results point to the fact that in our model the tier(firm)/class(consumer) structure is more rel-
evant than the expenditure shares. This is relatively straightforward to explain. As noted, the first
two classes of consumers with respect to income represent, respectively, 88% of total population
and 72% of total consumption.35 η and ηλ modify the expenditure shares and preferences of in-
come classes above the first one, as we move towards wealthier classes. The contribution of these
classes in shaping the level of firms employment and profits is notably limited.
Finally, the relation between output and productivity points to another fundamental mechanism
in the model that links the structure of production and demand to aggregate output. Table 17 shows
the correlation between labour productivity and real output estimated using a LAD estimator for
the average values across the 2000 periods. While in both cases labour productivity is positively
and significantly correlated to output, the relation is stronger for regime one than for regime two.
[TABLE 17 HERE]
However, as Table 7 suggests, higher output and productivity in regime one are also due to a
larger demand. With lower output, regime two experiences a small but significantly higher capital-
labour ratio. This implies that for the same level of output regime two may show a larger labour
productivity, related to the higher concentration of production. However, the uneven distribution of
productivity gains, due to institutional and structural differences, leads to an overall significantly
lower output and productivity.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In the last four decades most OECD countries have experienced a sharp increase in income in-
equality, mainly due to the raise in top incomes. During the same period, economies have also
reduced income growth, and some of them have entered stagnation following the 2008 crisis. The
34In the benchmark configuration the first class is populated by approximately 66% of the total population and
the second class by approximately 22% of the total population. Their share of total consumption is, respectively,
approximately 47% and 25%.
35In the benchmark scenario.
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observed changes in income distribution and growth are related to a number of changes in the
structure of the economy, such as decreasing labour shares, de-linked dynamics of productivity
and wages, increased mechanisation, increased rents, changes in consumer preferences and shares
of goods consumed, and increased concentration of production in fewer firms. These structural
changes have been accompanied by institutional changes that have increased the within-firm dif-
ferences in wages and the appropriation of innovation-induced rents.
In this paper we proposed a model to study the relation between income inequality and eco-
nomic growth due to exogenous institutional features and endogenous structural features of the
economy. We then studied the role of these features on the relation between income growth and
distribution by comparing the results from two different growth regimes.
The two regimes differ with respect to (i) labour relations – differences in compensation within
firms, profit shares, and the elasticity of wage with respect to productivity; (ii) norms of compe-
tition – entry barriers and market selection; and (iii) income related norms of consumption –
consumption shares, and consumer preferences. Regime one (Fordist) was characterised by rela-
tively more equal labour relations, more competition and lower selection, and smaller difference
in consumption behaviour across consumer classes. Regime two (post-Fordist) was characterised
as more unequal, with relatively more protection for incumbents and higher market selection, and
larger differences in consumption behaviour across consumer classes.
We find that a Fordist regime (one) exhibits significantly lower inequality, higher output and
lower unemployment than a Post-Fordist regime (two). We distinguish between institutional and
structural determinants of these differences, although we also suggest that the two types of deter-
minants are strongly related.
Institutional determinants are used to differentiate the two regimes with respect to labour rela-
tions, norms of competition, and norms of consumption. We find that, keeping all other features of
the regimes fixed, wage differences play the most important role in increasing inequality and lim-
iting output growth. The financial market magnifies the effect of wage differences by increasing
the wealth of high wage earners with respect to low wage earners. Accruing to these differences
and their negative effect on income distribution and output growth is also the share of profits dis-
tributed as bonuses. In our results, the role of the minimum wage, instead, is substantially weaker.
A lower elasticity with respect to price and productivity has a significant effect on output only
below a certain threshold.
The concentration of production also magnifies the negative effect of labour relations on in-
come distribution and output growth, suggesting the relevance of the norms of competition. How-
ever, in our model we find two opposite effects. On the one hand concentration through entry
barriers increases inequality and reduces output growth. On the other hand, concentration via
market selection reduces inequality, but has no effect on output.
Finally, the norms of consumption – changes in the distribution expenditure shares and in
consumer preferences – have no significant effect on either income distribution or output. This is
because the most relevant consumers in our model are those who work in the first two tiers (or
even in the first one). If wealthy income classes have different expenditure shares and preference
plays no substantial role in our model
Structural determinants, instead, are emerging properties in our model. First, in the absence
of any redistributive policies, an increase in average firm size have a direct effect on increasing
income inequality (see also Autor et al. (2017)). Change in the structure of production amplify the
effect of institutional difference in wage setting. In our model firm size is related to the norms of
competition, but it could also be related to technological features (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995)
or trade strategies (Keller and Olney, 2017).
Second, the structure of the demand also plays a crucial role. Sectors that attract the largest
share of consumption of low income classes tend to be also significantly less concentrated in our
model than sectors that sell mainly luxury goods. Alone, a higher share of employment in less
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concentrated sectors reduce overall concentration of production (with positive effects on income
distribution and output as discussed above). The structure of demand also influences competition:
sectors that constitute the largest expenditure shares of the low income classes face fiercer compe-
tition, more selective consumers with respect to price, and therefore tend to exhibit a low mark-up
in our model. This implies lower profits and dividends which accrue wealthier classes income.
Demand plays a crucial role in explaining the differences in output between the two regimes.
Even if regime two catches up in terms of productivity, due to the structure of demand the uneven
distribution curtails output growth.
In conclusion, in order to improve income distribution and, as a consequence, output growth,
policies should aim at breaking the vicious cycle between the institutional and the structural de-
terminants that in regime two (Post-Fordist) induces a more unequal distribution of income, lower
output, and higher unemployment. Assuming that expenditure shares do not change as a conse-
quence of distribution, and that firms retain a hierarchical organisation, the determinants of growth
and inequality that can be more easily addressed are the institutional ones.
For a given concentration of production, large differences in wages, returns to capital, and
bonuses may need to be capped, or redistributed through progressive taxation. On the other hand,
for given differences in wages, returns to capital and bonuses, reducing market concentration by
reducing barriers to entry (which may depend on trusts, but also on technology specific factors and
protection of property rights) would also be beneficial. Among the two, results from our model
suggest that the first type of redistributive would have a stronger impact.
Our model suggest that policies on the demand side that address consumer behaviour alone
may be less relevant. However, one crucial message from our model is that the structure of con-
sumption has a crucial bearing on the economy, shaping sectoral concentration and the related
structure of compensation. Redistributive policies should also consider non trivial effects of chang-
ing consumption behaviour and market selection as the demand becomes more homogeneous.
Although the results are robust under the two regimes explored in this paper, in future research
we will test the model with respect to more extreme regimes. The model can also be used to test
explicitly the effect of alternative fiscal policies. The model in itself if already relative rich, but
future work from the authors aim to explore an explicit modelling of the labour market, and an
open economy.
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A Remaining Components of the Model
In this appendix we report on the components of the model not already described in the main text,
where we discuss the most relevant elements of the model for definition of the growth regimes.
The elements reported below are crucial in understanding the functioning and outcome of the
model, though not directly connected to the discussion on growth regimes.
A.1 Macroeconomic Dynamics
The macroeconomic dynamic of the model is the result of the aggregation of the microeconomic
behaviour, except for the minimum wage which depends on aggregate changes in unemployment,
productivity, and inflation. Wages, therefore, link supply and demand side of the model via income
distribution, and mediate the feedback between the macro and micro dynamics. The remaining of
this section presents the computation of the main macroeconomic variables, and how they define
the minimum wage.
A.1.1 Aggregate Unemployment
We estimate the level of unemployment using the well established Beveridge Curve, the negative
relation between the rate of unemployment and the rate of vacancies, which are endogenously de-
termined at the firm-level in our model. In this respect, without explicitly modeling the dynamics
of the labour market we assume that it mimics a matching model (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001;
Yashiv, 2007). We adopt an hyperbolic form for the Beveridge curve as estimated in Bo¨rsch-Supan
(1991):
u(t) = 1+
β
v(t)+ϒ
(24)
where u(t) is unemployment rate at time t, ϒ is a constant, β defines the relation between the
vacancy rate v(t) and unemployment.36
For every tier of worker i in every firm k ∈ { f ,g} we estimate the number of vacancies Vi,k(t).
We assume that the vacancies in a given tier i are proportional to the vacancies in the shop-floor:
Vi,k(t) = ν1−iV1,k(t) (25)
The total number of vacancies for firm k can therefore be expressed as a multiple of the vacancies
for first-tier workers:
Vk(t) =
Λk(t)
∑
i=1
ν1−iV1,k(t) (26)
The vacancies at the shop-floor level are computed as the difference between the number of
shop-floor workers demanded to produce the planned output and the number of workers hired
(matched). Formally, for the final good sectors and the capital good sector respectively:
V1,n, f (t) = max
{
0 ; (1+υ)min{Q
d
f (t);B¯K f (t−1)}
A f (t−1) −L1,n, f (t−1)
}
V1,g(t) = max
{
0 ; (1+υg)
Kdg (t)
A f (t−1) −L1,g(t−1)
} (27)
The mismatch between firms’ labour demand and hiring depends on the parameter ε in equation
3.37 and is due to the assumed frictions in the labour market, which are equal in both regimes
36The Beveridge curve constant is set to 1, because values in Bo¨rsch-Supan (1991) range between -5 and 4.
37initialised with a value generating vacancy rates corresponding to the empirical evidence.
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The vacancy rate for firm k is then the ratio between vacancies and the overall labour demand:
vn,k(t) =
Vk(t)
Lk(t)+Vk(t)
(28)
The vacancy rate for the whole economy is computed as the average of firms’ vacancy rate
weighted by their contribution to total employment (L(t)):
L(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
Λ f (t)
∑
i=1
Li, f (t−1)+
G
∑
g=1
(Lg(t)+L0,g(t))
v(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F
∑
f=1
Ln, f (t)
L(t)
vn, f (t)+
G
∑
g=1
Lg(t)
L(t)
vg(t) (29)
A.1.2 Aggregate Consumption
The selection procedure described in Section 2.2.2 is replicated H times per consumer class, repre-
senting a distribution of H random draws of perceived price and quality. To establish the aggregate
expenditures directed at firm f in sector n we sum the H replicates that selected firm f ,n in the
subset of selected goods:
yn, f = Xn(t)
hn, f
H
(30)
where Xn(t) are the consumer class n expenditures and hn, f are the number of times that the
selection procedure selected product of firm f . Finally, the number of units sold is derived dividing
the revenues by the unit price:
xn, f =
yn, f
p f
(31)
Because consumers and firms are partially myopic there is a mismatch between the quantity
demanded and the quantity produced. See Section A.3.1.
A.1.3 GDP, and total Employment
The nominal GDP is the sum of the value of sales across sectors and firms, corresponding to final
and intermediate:
Y (t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
p f (t−1)Yf (t)+
G
∑
g=1
pg(t−1)Kg(t) (32)
where p f (t−1) and pg(t−1) are defined in Eqs. 20 and 52; Yf (t) = min
{
Yf (t);Q f (t)
}
, respec-
tively Eqs. 36 and 37; and Kg(t) is defined in Eq. 47.
Total employment is the sum of workers employed in all the tiers of all the firms in all sectors:
L(t) =
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f=1
Λ f (t)
∑
i=1
Li, f (t−1)+
G
∑
g=1
(Lg(t)+L0,g(t))
A.2 Consumer Classes
A.2.1 Savings and Rents
A class’s level of savings (Si(t)) is the income left to a consumer class after expenditure:
Si(t) = Di(t)−Xi(t)+D−i (t) = (1− (1− γ)(1− si))Di(t)− γXi(t−1)+D−i (t) (33)
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where D−i (t) are returns from past demands that could not be met by firms (see Section A.3.1 for
more details).
The savings by households are invested in the financial sector purchasing a financial title issued
by the financial sector, financial assets, providing access to future dividends. To simplify we do
not consider any other transaction on the financial market (financial assets cannot be traded among
consumers or firms). The number of financial assets pertaining to class i, Ui(t), is thus computed
as:
Ui(t) =Ui(t−1)+ Si(t)Pu(t) (34)
where Pu(t) is the current price of the financial asset (See Eq 57).
In line with recent empirical evidence (Dynan et al., 2004) we assume that the saving rate
si increases with income. Considering that classes are indexed according to increasing levels of
income, the desired saving rate of two adjacent classes can be expressed as:38
si = si−1 (1− ς)+ ς (35)
where ς is the rate growth of savings from class i to the next one.
A.3 Final Good Firms
A.3.1 Output
The total demand of a final good firm is the sum of expenditures over all bootstraps over all classes,
following the selection algorithm described in Section 2.2 and aggregated in Section A.1.2. If the
demand exceeds a firm supply, the total units sold Yf (t) corresponds to its current production
Q f (t):
Yf (t) = min
{
1
p f (t−1)
Λt
∑
z=1
Hn,z
∑
m=1
y fn,z,m,t
Xz,t
H
;Q f (t)
}
(36)
where p f (t−1) is the price charged by the firm at time t.
In the short-run firms produce using a fixed coefficient technology. The level of output pro-
duced Q f (t) is constrained by the availability of production factors:
Q f (t) = min
{
Qdf (t);A f (t−1)L1, f (t−1); B¯K f (t−1)
}
(37)
where A f (t − 1) is the level of productivity of labour L1, f (t − 1) embodied in the firms’ capital
stock K f (t−1), and 1B¯ is a constant capital stock intensity.39
Firms decide a desired output level Qdf (t) to match their expectations on sales Y
e
f (t), which are
formed accounting for past inventories (I f (t−1)> 0) or unfulfilled orders (I f (t−1)< 0):
Qdf (t) = (1+φ)Y
e
f (t)− I f (t−1) (38)
In order to cover unexpected changes in demand, firms maintain a level of inventories φY ef ,t –
where φ is a fixed ratio. Firms form their sales expectations (Y ef ,t) in an adaptive way to smooth
short term volatility
Y ef (t) = αY
e
f (t−1)+(1−α)Yf (t−1) (39)
where (1−α) is the rate at which expectations on demand converge to the current value of de-
mand, and Yf it total demand.
38We assume the the savings are equal for all consumers in a class.
39The constant assumption is corroborated by numerous empirical studies, starting with Kaldor (1957). The invest-
ment decision in in new capital vintages ensures that the capital stock intensity remains fixed over time.
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The difference between the planned production Qdf (t) and the actual output Q f ,t determines
the level of inventories I f (t−1):
I f (t) = Qdf (t)−Q f (t) (40)
When demand exceeds output, firms increase the value of backlogs (negative inventories) to
be fulfilled with future output and increases the mark-up. Consumer classes failing to access
demanded goods because of insufficient production keep their unspent money as forced savings
while waiting for a delivery in the future. These resources are employed as extra-consumption
when the firm is able to fulfil the order, or remain as permanent savings in case a firm cannot
fulfil the order. In other words, we assume that at each time step backlogs are either fulfilled –
delivering past unfulfilled sales – or reduced by a fixed ratio – representing orders cancelled by
consumers. The value of cancelled goods is returned to the consumer class that purchased them in
the past contributing to its saving and therefore future consumption.40
Backlogs negatively affect firms’ visibility (υˆ f ,t), assuming that consumers prefer to buy goods
from firms that can deliver immediately. Visibility is computed as a moving average of the ratio
of the difference between expected sales and backlogs and expected sales:
υˆ f (t) = υˆ f (t−1)αυˆ +
max{Y ef (t)−BL f (t),0.001}
Y ef (t)
(1−αυˆ) (41)
where αυˆ is the pace at which visibility adapts through time.
A.3.2 Production Capacity and Productivity
Following Amendola and Gaffard (1998) and Llerena and Lorentz (2004) the accumulation of
capital stock is a pre-condition for producing and a determinant of labour productivity. A firm’s
f capital stock K f (t) is the sum of capital vintages k f ,g(τ) purchased from capital good firm g in
time τ and cumulated through time:
K f (t) =
t
∑
τ=1
k f ,g(τ)(1−δ )t−τ (42)
where δ is the depreciation rate. The level of productivity embodied in the capital stock is com-
puted as the average productivity across all the vintages available:
A f (t) =
1
K f (t)
t
∑
τ=1
k f ,g(τ)(1−δ )t−τag(τ) (43)
where ag(τ) is the productivity embodied in the h vintage.41
A.3.3 Investment in Capital Stock
Firms investment in a new a vintage (kdf (t)) is a function of expected sales Y
e
f (t), the level of
production capacity given the capital stock and labor force currently available, respectively Y Kf (t)
and Y Lf (t), and the current amount of backlog sales, BL f (t).
kdf (t) = max{min{Y Lf (t)αk;
(
Y ef (t)+ B¯L f (t)βk
)
(1+υ)}−Y Kf (t);0}B¯ (44)
40Given that in our model consumption occurs at the level of the class, and goods are then distributed to consumers,
there is no rationing at the consumer level. We assume that although all consumers make a demand for all goods in all
periods, only consumers who have not purchased the good in previous periods will need it. In other words, backlogs is
a simplifying assumption to provide firms with market signals about future demand and allow consumers from a class
to consume the same good in different time periods.
41When completely depreciated capital vintages are disposed off at no cost.
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where αk is a multiplier expanding the increase of capital stock to a multiple of the available labor
force, in order to avoid capital stock bottlenecks in the short period (in line with the assumption
that capital stock investment is lumpy); βk is a coefficient indicating a share of the backlog sales
that the firms would like to absorb with the new investment; υ is the share of desired unused
(capital stock) capacity; B¯ is the intensity of capital stock, translating production into units of
capital.
All capital investment is financed with loans, without discriminating between firms (selection
is done by consumers in our model).42 The financial institution grants the loan to any firm with
a probability proportional to the ratio between the cash available in the institution (Γ(t)) and the
total value of the resources in the financial sector (Θ(t)) (see equations 54 and 55). Rejected loans
are resubmitted in following time steps until accepted.43
When investing in a new vintage, firms f select one of the capital good producers g∈{1; ...;G}
and place an order kdg, f (t) for the desired amount of capital goods. A capital good producer is
selected with a probability that depends positively on the vintage’s productivity ag(t − 1), and
negatively on its price pg(t− 1) and on g’s delivery time. Hence, capital good producers with a
big order book may be discarded, even if they produce the best capital vintage, because delays in
acquiring a new vintage may cause large losses for f .
After a capital producing firm receives an order it place it in its order book, using its production
capacity to complete all the orders in the order they arrived.
A.4 Capital Good Firms
The capital good sector is populated by g ∈ {1,2, . . . ,G} capital suppliers that produce one type
of capital good with an embodied productivity ag(t). Firms in the capital good sector may sell
to firms from any of the final good sectors, when they receive an order kdf ,g(t). Capital goods are
produced on a first in, first out rule, and the time needed to produce each of them depends on
firms’ capacity and the number of orders.
A.4.1 Production
We assume that the production of capital goods is just-in-time, with no expectation formation or
accumulation of inventories. The total demand Kdg (t) for a capital supplier g at t is the sum of the
current order and earlier unfinished orders (Ig(t−1)):
Kdg (t) =
F(t)
∑
f=1
kdg, f (t)+ Ig(t−1) (45)
We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that capital good firms employ only labour, with con-
stant productivity:
Qg(t) = L1,g(t−1) (46)
where L1,g(t−1) are the shop-floor workers. The amount produced is then the minimum between
a firm’s capacity and demand:
Kg(t) = min{Qg(t);Kdg (t)} (47)
and unfinished orders are the difference between current production and the sum of unfinished
orders in t−1:
Ig(t) =
t
∑
τ=1
Kdg (τ)−
t
∑
τ=1
Kgτ (48)
42We assume that all profits are distributed to households as dividends.
43In the configurations adopted in this paper this form of rationing is rare and, when it happens, is lasts a maximum
of a few time steps.
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The total number of workers in a firm can be computed as:
Lg(t) = L1g(t)+ ...+L
Λg(t)
g (t) = L1,g(t)
Λg(t)
∑
i=1
ν1−i+ρgL1g(t) (49)
where ρg is the share of engineers per shop-floor worker.
A.4.2 Process Innovation
Capital good producers improve the productivity embodied in capital vintages ag(t) by means of
their R&D department staffed by L0,g(t) engineers. The number of engineers is a constant share
ρg of the total number of the firm’s employees. In the tradition of Schumpeterian growth models
(Silverberg and Verspagen, 2005), the outcome of R&D is stochastic and the probability of an
increase in productivity (Φg(t)) depends on the amount of financial resources invested to increase
the total number of engineers (L0,g(t−1)):
Φg(t) = 1− e−ζL0,g(t−1) (50)
where ζ is the effectiveness of R&D investment.
If the R&D is successful, the productivity of the new capital vintage is randomly drawn from
a normal distribution with average ag(t− 1) and a variance σa representing the speed of techno-
logical change:
ag(t) = ag(t−1)(1+max{εg(t);0}) (51)
where εg(t)∼ N(0;σa).
A.4.3 Production Costs, Pricing, and Financial Account
Wages follow the same hierarchical structure as for firms in the final good sectors (Eq. 6). The
wage of engineers working in the R&D department is a multiple ω0 of the minimum wage.
The price of capital goods pg(t) is a fixed mark-up m¯g over variable costs: shop-floor workers,
executives, and engineers, divided by the level of output Qg,t :
pg(t) = (1+ m¯g)
(
∑Λg(t)i=1 wi,g(t)Li,g(t−1)+w0,g(t)L0,g(t−1)
Qg(t)
)
(52)
where w0,g(t) is the wage of engineers.
Profits are computed as the difference between revenues and labor costs:
Πg(t) = pg(t)Kg(t)−
Λg(t)
∑
i=1
wi,g(t)Li,g(t−1)−w0,g(t)L0,g(t−1) (53)
If profits are positive, a share pi is distributed as premia to the managers of the firm in propor-
tion to their share of the payroll (Eq. 9) and a share ρg is invested in R&D. The remaining profits
(1−pi −ρg) are pooled with those from all firms and distributed as dividends to households, in
proportion to the number of financial assets owned by each class.
A.5 Financial Sector
The financial sector is an institution dealing with all the financial aspects of firms and households.
For firms, it provides loans to purchase new capital goods and cover losses: firms’ debt are reg-
istered as assets of the financial sector. Concerning households the financial sector receives their
savings and issues a financial asset in exchange. Households’ financial assets correspond to shares
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in firms capital (though loans). When firms pay dividends out of profits, the share of assets owned
by a household’s class (equivalent to the savings cumulated through time) determines the share of
dividends distributed to that class. Dividends do not pertain to the financial sector, they form part
of household’s income.
The financial institution rests on a fundamental identity: the value of all the financial assets
owned by households is identical to the value of all assets stored in the financial institution. The
financial institution owns two types of assets: the cash collected from households and not yet used
for loans, and the outstanding loans cumulated by existing firms. The total value of the financial
sector is expressed as:44
Θ(t) = Γ(t)+
F+G
∑
k=1
Kˆk(t) (54)
where k ∈ { f ,g}. The value of the stock of cash in the financial sector (Γ(t)) increases with new
households’ savings, and decreases with the loans granted to firms:
Γ(t) = Γ(t−1)+
Λ
∑
i=1
Si(t)−
F+G
∑
k=1
Jlk(t) (55)
where Si(t) are consumer class i savings; Jlk is the loan received by firm k ∈ { f ,g}. The value of
the outstanding loans consists of the sum of all past loans to firms minus the debt owned by firms
that went bankrupt and exited the market:
F+G
∑
k=1
Kˆk(t) =
F+G
∑
k=1
Kˆk(t−1)+
F+G
∑
k=1
Jlk(t)− ∑
k∈W (t)
Kˆk(t) (56)
where W (t) is the set of firms that went out of business at time t. We assume that society bares the
cost of bankruptcy.
As shown in eq. 34 consumer classes use their savings to purchase a unique form of financial
title, the financial assets (Ui(t)), issued by the financial sector. The price of an asset, Pu(t), is
determined by the ratio between the total value of the financial sector Θ(t−1) and the number of
financial assets collectively owned by households in t−1:45
Pu(t) =
Θ(t−1)
∑Λi=1Ui(t−1)
(57)
The dividends received by household class i (Ei(t)) is computed as the share of distributed
profits generated by all firms at time t proportional to the share of the assets owned by the class:
Ei(t) = (1−pi−ρ)
F
∑
i= f
Π f
Ui(t)
∑Λ(t)j=1 U j
+(1−pi−ρg)
G
∑
i=g
Πg
Ui(t)
∑Λ(t)j=1 U j
(58)
44We adopt the convention that the nominal value of the debt is constantly equal to the loans received as long as the
firm remains in activity, and then turns to zero in case the firm exits the market.
45In general, the price of financial assets, such as companies’ stocks, is determined by trade, and consequently the
market value of a company is computed multiplying the price by the number of outstanding stocks. In our model the
financial assets are not traded and we use the same identity to compute the price, determined by the ratio of the total
value of the financial sector (cash plus debt) and the number of assets. In this way we ensure that the total value of the
financial assets owned by households equals the current value of the financial sector.
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B Indices
We discuss the computation of the indexes used in the results sections.
Atkinson Inequality Index
Income inequality is measured using the Atkinson index Aind(t) computed as follows:
Aind(t) = 1− 1
∑Λ(t)i=1
Di(t)
L(t)
[
1
L(t)
Λ(t)
∑
i=1
Li(t)
(
Di(t)
Li(t)
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
(59)
where Di(t) is the total income for consumer class i, Li(t) is the total number of workers in class
i, and ρ is the measure of inequality aversion.
Concentration of Output and Employment across Sectors
We measure the degree of concentration of production in terms of output and employment using
an inverse Herfindahl index:
HY (t) =
[
N
∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f
(
pn, f (t−1)Yn, f (t)
Y (t)
)2
+
G
∑
g
(
pg(t−1)Kg(t)
Y (t)
)2]−1
(60)
HL(t) =
[
∑
j
(
L j(t)
∑ j=1L j(t)
)2]−1
(61)
We measure the degree of concentration in sales in the final good sector using an inverse
Herfindahl index:
I (t) =
 N∑
n=1
F(t)
∑
f
 pn, f (t−1)Yn, f (t)
∑Nn=1∑
F(t)
f pn, f (t−1)Yn, f (t)
2

−1
(62)
Value Added, Output, and Employment Sectoral Shares
We measure the contribution of the value added of each sectors to GDPY j(t), the respective shares
of outputQ j(t) and employmentL j(t) for each final good sector and the capital good sector j:
Y j(t) =
p j(t−1)Yj(t)
Y (t)
with Yj(t) =
F(t)
∑
f=1
Yj, f (t)∀n ∈ 1, ...N or Yj(t) =
G
∑
g=1
Kg(t) (63)
L j(t) =
L j(t)
L(t)
with L j(t) =
F(t)
∑
f=1
L j, f (t)∀n ∈ 1, ...N or L j(t) =
G
∑
g=1
L j, f (t) (64)
Capital-Labour ratio – Degree of Mechanisation
We measure the degree of mechanisation of the EconomyM (t) as follows:
M (t) =
∑Nj=1∑
F(t)
f=1 K j, f (t)
L(t)
(65)
In doing so we consider the changes in the factor composition of the production.
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Households’ Income Composition
To account for changes in the structure of households’ income we measure the contribution of
wage and profits, respectively as the share of wage income in the total income W (t), the share of
premia in total incomeP(t), and the share of returns on savings in total income E (t):
W (t) =
∑Λ(t)i=1 Wi(t)
D(t)
(66)
P(t) =
∑Λ(t)i=1 Ψi(t)
D(t)
(67)
E (t) =
∑Λ(t)i=1 Ei(t)
D(t)
(68)
The remaining share corresponds to the rents on savings.
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C Initialisation
Parameter Description Value Data
α Adaptation of sales expectations 0.9 –a
φ Desired ratio of inventories 0.1 [0.11 - 0.25]b
υ Unused labor/capital capacity 0.05 [0.042 - 0.075]c
υg Unused labor capacity in the capital
good sector
0.2 [0.042 - 0.075]c2
m¯ Minimum mark-up 0.15 [0-0.28]; [0.1, 0.28]; [0.1, 0.39]d
µ Mark-up variation 0.3 [0-0.28]; [0.1, 0.28]; [0.1, 0.39]d
m¯g Mark-up in the capital good sector 0.2 [0-0.28]; [0.1, 0.28]; [0.1, 0.39]d
δ Capital depreciation 0.001 [0.03, 0.14]; [0.016, 0.31]e
1
B¯ Capital intensity 0.5 B¯ = [1.36, 2.51]
f
ε Labor market friction 0.3 0.6; [0.6, 1.5]; [0.7, 1.4]; [0.3, 1.4]g
ω Minimum wage multiplier 1.6 [1.6, 3.7]h
b Executives wage multiplier 1.6 [1.5, 2]h2analysed
ω0 Engineers’ wage multiplier 2 [1.2, 1.4]h3
pi Profits shared as bonuses 0.15 –i analysed
ν Tier multiplier 3 [2, 7] j
ηλ λ inter-class multiplier 0.25 [-0.8, 2.4]k, analysed
λq,1 First tier quality selectivity 0¯.1, anal-
ysed
–l1
λp,1 First tier price selectivity 0¯.9, anal-
ysed
–l1
λmin Lowest selectivity 0.1 –l2
λmax Highest selectivity 0.9 –l2
η Convergence to asymptotic consump-
tion shares
0.4 analysed
ρ R&D investment share in final good
sectors
0.2 [0.01-0.231]m
ρg R&D engineers share in capital good
sector
0.1 [0.01-0.231]m
ζ Probability of process innovation suc-
cess
0.01 [0.07, 0.18]; [0.013, 0.198]n
χ Probability of product innovation trial
success
0.05 [0.07, 0.18]; [0.013, 0.198]n
Ξ Min. interval between two successful
innovations
10 –
σa Standard deviation productivity shock (0.015,
0.004)
–o
σq Standard deviation product quality in-
novation
0.01 –o1
c¯n Asymptotic consumption shares –+,x1 –+,p1
c1,n First class consumption shares –+,x2 –+,p2
ς Increase in saving rate across income
classes
0.2 –q
1− γ Expenditure smoothing parameter 0.2 [.04, .14]; [.06, .19]r
εU Wage curve unemployment pressure 0.1 0.1s
ι Error in the consumer’s evaluation of
characteristics
p: 0.05; q:
0.1
–t
β Beveridge curve parameter 20 [6, 10]u
ϒ Beveridge curve constant 0.2 –u
εP Wage curve inflation elasticity 1 analysed
εA Wage curve productivity elasticity 1 analysed
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ΩA Increase in average productivity for
wage renegotiations to occur
0.0001 –w
ΩP Increase in average price for wage rene-
gotiations to occur
0.0001 –w
ϑ Probability of firm entry in a sector 0.08 analysed
ξ Exit threshold 0.001 –x
a Smoothing parameter of profits moving
average
0.95 –
αυˆ Smoothing parameter of visibility 0.9 –
αk Labour multiplier in capital stock in-
vestment decision
10 –
βk backlogs absorption in capital stock in-
vestment decision
0.1 –
ρ Atkinson index inequality aversion 0.5 –
F (0) Initial number of final good firms 100 –
G Capital good firms 10 –
N Final good sectors 10 –
Λ(t) Number of classes/tiers E∗ –
H Consumer good iterations per sector 151 –
aEmpirical evidence not available: the parameters has no influence on the results presented here. bU.S. Census Bureau
(2008); Bassin et al. (2003). cCoelli et al. (2002) with reference to the ‘optimal’ unused capacity for labour (low value)
and to the average ratio between technical efficient production and ray economic capacity in the airline industry. c2
Larger than in the consumer good sector, due to the lumpiness of orders for capital goods (Doms and Dunne, 1998).
dMarchetti (2002); De Loecker and Warzynski (2009); Joaquim Oliveira et al. (1996). eNadiri and Prucha (1996);
Fraumeni (1997) non residential equipment and structures. We use the lower limit value (the lower value reflects the
assumption that in our model one simulation step represents approximately the dynamics of a fortnight (one year is
24 steps). f King and Levine (1994). gVacancy duration (days or weeks) over one month: Davis et al. (2010); Jung
and Kuhn (2011); Andrews et al. (2008); DeVaro (2005). hRatio with respect to the average wage (not minimum)
in OECD countries Boeri (2009). h2Simon (1957). i With reference to qualitative evidence from various sources.
h3Relative to all College Graduates and to accountants Ryoo and Rosen (1992). We set the parameter to a higher
value to differentiate engineer’s compensation from shop-floor workers’. jSimon (1957). kChange of price selectivity
for food product categories (Zheng and Henneberry, 2011) (inverted signs, as we use the change in selectivity rather
than in price elasticity). l1Empirical evidence not available to our knowledge: based on qualitative evidence. The
values are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution, respectively λq,1 ∼U [0.05,0.15] and λp,1 ∼U [0.85,0.95].
l1Empirical evidence not available to our knowledge: based on qualitative evidence. mHerna´ndez et al. (2015). We
use a ratio close to the high end of high tech sectors. n Respectively Hay et al. (2014) and Pammolli et al. (2011)
on the pharma industry from phase I to approval. For product innovation we take a lower bound value, given that
the pharma industry is particularly innovative. For process innovation (capital good sector) we take a lower value.
oEmpirical evidence not available to our knowledge. Extensive analysis of this parameter has was done in past models
(Ciarli et al., 2012), and is left for future work on this model. The two values refer, respectively, to the validation and
the regimes analysis. We reduce variance in the analysis of regimes substantially in order to limit the effect due to
stochastic shocks. o1Empirical evidence not available to our knowledge. p1We use the UK Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) to compute the consumption shares across the ten aggregate consumption categories for the top centile of UK
consumers (p99 in Figure 3). p2We use the UK FES to compute the consumption shares across the ten aggregate
consumption categories for the bottom decile of UK consumers (p10 in Figure 3). Gervais and Klein (2010). qBased
on the evidence on the increase in the saving rate by income quintile in Dynan et al. (2004). rKrueger and Perri (2005).
sWe implement the estimated wage equation in logs and use the widely estimated parameter (Nijkamp and Poot, 2005;
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2006). tSpecific empirical evidence not available to the best of our knowledge. Parameters
set using the qualitative evidence in Zeithaml (1988) and the findings summarised in Rotemberg (2008). uEstimates
from Bo¨rsch-Supan (1991). Most empirical exercises test a linear or quadratic form of the Beveridge curve (Wall and
Zoega, 2002; Nickell et al., 2002; Teo et al., 2004; Bouvet, 2012) – a mean value of these estimates is found in Fagiolo
et al. (2004). For modelling purposes the hyperbolic form is more convenient, but estimates are a bit outdated, so
we adapt them using the more recent papers covering several countries. The constant ϒ is meant to avoid extreme
asymptotic values. w We assume a nearly continuous adjustment. xAssumed to allow firms in the market until their
return on capital has nearly no value. ∗Endogenous. +Various
Table 1: Parameters setting. Parameter’s (1) name, (2) description, (3) value, and (4) empirical
data range when its effect is not analysed in section 3
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D Figures
D.1 Paper
Notes. Dashed lines represent goods or services exchanged between the agents and solid lines represent money flows.
Figure 1: Flow diagram of the model.
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(b) Aggregate labour productivity
Notes. Panel 2a exhibits the time series for aggregate output, investment, and consumption. All series are in logs. Out-
put and consumption are in real values (deflated with a price index). Investment is proxied by the physical production
of capital goods. Panel 2b exhibits the series for aggregate labour productivity computed as the total number of output
over the total number of workers.
Figure 2: Main macro series (2a) and productivity (2b): .
Figure 3: Expenditure shares: initial (ci,n, p10) and asymptotic (c¯n, p99). The distribution of the asymp-
totic level of shares corresponds to the shares of expenditures for the higher percentile of UK consumers in
2005-6. The distribution of the level of shares of the first class corresponds to the shares of expenditures for
the bottom decile of UK consumers in 2005-6. We thank Alessio Moneta for sharing the data with us.
Source: Own elaboration using UK FES
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E Tables
E.1 Paper
Parameter Equation Regime 1 Regime 2
Wage difference between tiers: b 6 low high
Profit shares distributed to executives: pi 8 low high
Elasticity of the minimum wage to produc-
tivity:
εA 11 high low
Elasticity of the minimum wage to prices: εP 11 high low
Table 2: Parameters of the wage-labour nexus dimension of the growth regimes.
Parameter Equation Regime 1 Regime 2
Changes in consumer preferences: ηλ 17 lower higher
Changes in expenditure shares: η 15 lower higher
Table 3: Parameters of the consumption dimension of the growth regimes.
Parameter Equation Regime 1 Regime 2
Probability of entry: ϑ – higher lower
Consumer’s selectivity with respect to
price:
λmin 17 lower higher
Consumer’s selectivity with respect to
quality:
λmax 17 lower higher
Table 4: Parameters of the competition dimension of the growth regimes.
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Empirical regularity Figure/Table
Macro
Endeogenous growth 2
Business cycles 4
Auto-correlations of key variables 5
Cross-correlation of key variables 6
7
Beveridge curve 8a
Wage curve 18
Output growth distribution (fat tailed) 8b
Meso
Firm size distribution (log normal) 9
Firm growth distribution (skewed and fat tailed) 9
Growth of average firm size 10b
Micro
Productivity differences 10
19
Capital stock investment (lumpiness) 10d
Notes. For a complete discussion about the relation between the results of our model, the empirical evidence, and
similar models, please refer to Appendix F.
Table 5: Macro, meso and micro empirical regularities tested and reproduced by the model
Dimension Parameter Benchmark Regime 1 Regime 2
Wage labour
nexus
Wage difference between tiers: b 1.6 1.4 1.8
Profit shares distributed to exec-
utives:
pi 0.15 0.1 0.35
Elasticity of the minimum wage
to productivity:
εA 1 1 0.8
Elasticity of the minimum wage
to inflation:
εP 1 1 0.8
Competition Probability of entry: ϑ 0.08 0.1 0.06
Consumer’s selectivity with re-
spect to price:
λ ap,1 0¯.9 0¯.775 0¯.975
Consumer’s selectivity with re-
spect to quality:
λ bq,1 0¯.1 0¯.225 0¯.025
Consumption Changes in consumer prefer-
ences:
ηλ 0.25 0.2 0.3
Changes in expenditure shares: η 0.4 0.3 0.5
Notes. aThe values are randomly drawn from uniform distributions, respectively λp,1 ∼ U [0.85,0.95], λp,1 ∼
U [0.75,0.8] and λp,1 ∼U [0.95,1]. bThe values are randomly drawn from uniform distributions, respectively, λq,1 ∼
U [0.05,0.15], λq,1 ∼U [0.2,0.25], and λq,1 ∼U [0,0.05] .
Table 6: Parametrisation of the two Growth Regimes.
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Regime 1 Regime 2 mean difference test
(Fordist) (Post-Fordist) t stat. p-value
Output (real) 4382302 2848252 37.73 2.4e-37
Atkinson Index (Aind) 0.140 0.258 -143.4 7.4e-65
Unemployment Rate 4.624 4.804 -22.04 9.3e-27
Average Income Level 404.233 502.803 -108.7 4.1e-59
Average Profit Level 913257.72 1004774.08 -13.48 6.1e-18
Minimum Wage Level 222.850 206.559 45.02 6.4e-41
Wage-Income Ratio (W ) 0.738 0.698 36.91 6.8e-37
Premia-Income Ratio 0.025 0.021 181.531 9.2e-70
Dividends-Income Ratio (E ) 0.236 0.281 -40.07 1.5e-38
Aggregate Productivity 2.032 1.993 17.11 4.5e-22
Embodied Productivity 3.549 3.479 21.96 1.1e-26
Capital-Labour Ratio 5.792 5.818 -3.26 0.0020
Value-Added Concentration 7.804 7.901 -25.89 7.4e-30
Employment Concentration 15.987 16.104 -8.73 1.7e-11
Inverse Herfindahl Index (HY ) 103.85 72.07 71.18 2.5e-50
Consumption Concentration 6.952 7.088 -186.4 2.5e-70
Notes: Mean values over 25 replications for the average outcome over 2000 simulation steps.
Table 7: Main Macroeconomic Indicators for the Two Growth Regimes.
Real output Const.
Regime one (Fordist): Atkinson Index 6.707e-09** 0.166***
(2.431e-09) (0.003)
Regime two (Post-Fordist): Atkinson Index 2.140e-08** 0.196***
(8.255e-09) (0.023)
Notes: Least Absolute Deviation estimates computed using the Barrodale-Roberts simplex algorithm for average output
over the 2000 periods, 25 replications. LAD standard errors computed using 500 bootstraps. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 8: Inequality and Otuput
b
1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8
1 0,139*** 0,163*** 0,190 0,220*** 0,254***
0,95 0,139*** 0,163*** 0,190 0,220*** 0,254***
εA; 0,9 0,139*** 0,164*** 0,189 0,219*** 0,256***
εP 0.85 0,139*** 0,163*** 0,189 0,219*** 0,253***
0,8 0,140*** 0,162*** 0,190 0,219*** 0,254***
0,75 0,140*** 0,162*** 0,189 0,219*** 0,253***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average Atkinson index over 2000 simulation steps. The significance
of the difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: Atkinson index for different wage multipliers and elasticities of the minimum wage to
productivity and consumer price
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b
1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8
0,1 0,134*** 0,157*** 0,185*** 0,216*** 0,249***
0,15 0,139*** 0,163*** 0,189 0,219*** 0,253***
pi 0,2 0,144*** 0,167*** 0,193*** 0,223*** 0,256***
0,25 0,149*** 0,173*** 0,198*** 0,228*** 0,261***
0,3 0,155*** 0,176*** 0,202*** 0,229*** 0,262***
0,35 0,159*** 0,181*** 0,206*** 0,234*** 0,266***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average Atkinson index over 2000 simulation steps. The significance
of the difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 10: Atkinson index for different wage multipliers and profit shares used for premia
ϑ
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0¯.725; 0¯.275 0,196*** 0,194*** 0,193*** 0,192*** 0,192***
0¯.775; 0¯.225 0,193*** 0,193*** 0,191*** 0,189 0,188
λp,1; 0¯.825; 0¯.175 0,191*** 0,191** 0,189 0,186*** 0,185***
λq,1 0¯.875; 0¯.125 0,189 0,187* 0,186*** 0,185*** 0,183***
0¯.925; 0¯.075 0,187** 0,186*** 0,184*** 0,182*** 0,182***
0¯.975; 0¯.025 0,186*** 0,184*** 0,183*** 0,182*** 0,181***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average Atkinson index over 2000 simulation steps. The significance
of the difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: Atkinson index for different levels of competition
b
1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8
0,1 4864020*** 4235668*** 4011631** 3683588 3376438***
0,15 4661710*** 4203255*** 3759496 3394171*** 3280909***
pi 0,2 4654574*** 3987314* 3519672*** 3335034*** 3179175***
0,25 4305037*** 4070668* 3631770 3280466*** 3074743***
0,3 4439873*** 3781925 3428948** 3108936*** 2915391***
0,35 4187097*** 3697132 3257111*** 3058699*** 2824506***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average output over 2000 simulation steps. The significance of the
difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Real output for different wage multipliers and profit shares used for premia
b
1,4 1,5 1,6 1,7 1,8
1 4740017*** 4369584*** 3820829 3416749,5*** 3271559***
0.95 4745794*** 4230409*** 3816053 3394517*** 3264894***
εA; 0.9 4596226*** 4265252*** 3715884 3549755*** 3278798***
εP 0.85 4595772*** 4156223*** 3717243 3526538*** 3280086***
0.8 4846935*** 4109146*** 3835208 3451350*** 3247899***
0.75 4999338*** 4167746*** 3660339,5** 3469940*** 3303616***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average output over 2000 simulation steps. The significance of the
difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: Real output for different wage multipliers and elasticities of the minimum wage to
productivity and consumer price
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ϑ
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0¯.725; 0¯.275 3437995*** 3750586*** 4037649 4475096*** 5066091***
0¯.775; 0¯.225 3330494*** 3823845** 4147320 4244693 4757535***
λp,1; 0¯.825; 0¯.175 3259839*** 3731741*** 4094730 4179639 4659407***
λq,1 0¯.875; 0¯.125 3230594*** 3570274*** 4044367 4312567** 4694119***
0¯.925; 0¯.075 3136186*** 3501718*** 3917487* 4200508 4742372***
0¯.975; 0¯.025 3156582*** 3461134*** 3908788* 4431726 4821741***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average output over 2000 simulation steps. The significance of the
difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Real output for different levels of competition
ηλ
0.2 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.3
0.3 3740007 3699658 3706482 3726182 3633038
0.35 3970438*** 3800109 3823381* 3783792 3921054***
η 0.4 3723198 3645007 3653136 3737845 3775070*
0.45 3722838 3700330 3788916 3797486* 3732221
0.5 3847599** 3780407 3798296* 3841521** 3752458
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average output over 2000 simulation steps. The significance of the
difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15: Real output for varying differences in consumption shares and consumer preferences
across consumer classes
ηλ
0.2 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.3
0.3 0.1880 0.1885 0.1880 0.1890 0.1897
0.35 0.1889 0.1884 0.1886 0.1903* 0.1903**
η 0.4 0.1889 0.1886 0.1886 0.1896 0.1902**
0.45 0.1878 0.1879 0.1888 0.1898 0.1899*
0.5 0.1881 0.1880 0.1886 0.1902* 0.1899
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average Atkinson index over 2000 simulation steps. The significance
of the difference between the benchmark configuration (in italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 16: Atkinson index for varying differences in consumption shares and consumer prefer-
ences across consumer classes
Real output Const.
Regime 1 (Fordist) Labour Productivity 4.44e-08*** 1.828***
(2.431e-09) (0.003)
Regime 2 (Post-Fordist) Labour Productivity 4.11e-08*** 1.872***
(8.255e-099) (0.023)
Notes: Least Absolute Deviation estimates computed using the Barrodale-Roberts simplex algorithm for average output
over the 2000 periods, 25 replications. LAD standard errors computed using 500 bootstraps. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 17: Labour Productivity and Output
49
F Empirical Validation
The feedbacks between technological and demand dynamics generate business fluctuations.46 Fig-
ure 4 plots business cycles for output (4a), investment (4b), consumption (4c), and unemployment
(4d) computed using the Hodrick-Prescott high-pass filter. To make the fluctuations comparable,
the cyclical component was normalised by the series trend.
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(d) Unemployment
Notes. The four panels exhibits the cyclical components of output (4a), investment (4b), consumption (??), and unem-
ployment (4d). To separate the trend from the cyclical component we employ a Hodrick-Prescott high-pass filter. The
cyclical component is normalised by the series trend.
Figure 4: Cyclcical component of the main macro variables
All series exhibit fluctuations that are qualitative similar to those observed in the data (Assenza
et al., 2015; Caiani et al., 2016; Dosi et al., 2010, 2015). The volatility of employment and in-
vestment is significantly higher than that of consumption and output. Consumption is less volatile
than output. Differently from observed time series, in our model investment is more volatile than
employment. This is related to the lumpiness of capital stock investment which in our model is
constrained by the choice of capital good producers, and their production cue (we do not model
entry of new firms in the capital good sector).
Figure 5 plots the autocorrelation structure for de-trended real output (5a), investment (5b),
consumption (??), and unemployment (5d) for 20 lags. The simulated series are quite similar to
real series (Assenza et al., 2015). The first lag autocorrelation of real series estimated by Assenza
et al. (2015) for output, investment, consumption, and unemployment are, respectively, 0.8485,
0.7952, 0.8176, 0.6454. For our simulated series, the first lag autocorrelations are 0.8492, 0.8169,
0.9577, and 0.6826.
Figure 6 plots the cross-correlation between the cyclical component of real output and the
cyclical components of, respectively, real output (6a), investment (6b), consumption (6c), and
unemployment (6d) for 10 lags. Investment is pro-cyclical and coincident, consumption follow
with a couple of lags, as in Caiani et al. (2016), and short term unemployment is countercyclical
and coincident.
The model replicates a number of other macro stylised facts (Caiani et al., 2016; Dosi et al.,
2010, 2015). Figure 7 plots the cross-correlation between the cyclical component of real output
and a number of other aggregate dynamics. In line with the literature, growth of inventories is pro-
cyclical and increases sharply (7a); the ratio between inventories and sales is counter cyclical (7b);
average wages are pro-cyclical but lagged (7c); whereas average mark-ups are counter-cyclical
(7d).
Labour market regularities also emerge in our model. Figure 8a plots the Beveridge curve. We
estimated the relation between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate for the 100 simulation
replicates, and for the whole sample. The light gray series are the single run curves obtained from
plotting the residuals of the following polynomial regression of order two: utr = αb +αb1 vtr +
46As we have observed earlier, the feedbacks are slightly more complex at the micro level, depending on firms’
growth and competition, which depends on their investment in product and process innovation and on consumer pref-
erences, which depend on firm growth and industrial dynamics.
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Notes. The four panels exhibits autocorrelation graphs for de-trended real output (5a), investment (5b), consumption
(5c), and unemployment (5d) for 20 lags. The autocorrelations is computed with pointwise confidence intervals (light
blue lines) based on Bartlett’s formula for moving average time series of order 20 (MA(20)). On the horizontal axis are
the number of lags and on the vertical axis the autocorrelation.
Figure 5: Autocorrelation of the main macro variables: output, investment, consumption,
and unemploymnet
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Notes. The four panels exhibits crosscorrelation plots between the cyclical component of real output and the cyclical
component of real output (6a), investment (6b), consumption (6c), and unemployment (6d) for 10 lags. On the horizon-
tal axis are the number of lags and on the vertical axis the crosscorrelation between the cyclical components of the two
series at a given lag.
Figure 6: Crosscorrelation between the cyclical component of output and the main macro
variables: output, investment, consumption, and unemploymnet
αb2 v
2
tr + ιb +αb3 vtrι
b + εbt , where r is a simulation iteration, ιb is a run fixed effect, and εb the
residual. The black series is the regression fit of the data pooled from the different series, and the
red bands represent the confidence interval. Overall, the curve is quite close to that found from a
number of countries (Nickell et al., 2002).
We also tested for the wage curve. Because in our model the wage curve shifts with changes
in price and productivity, plots are not particularly informative. We estimated the relation between
unemployment rate and wages with a panel estimator with fixed effects and robust standard errors
clustered at the simulation run level, controlling for the indexes of productivity and price.47 Table
18 shows that the results are remarkably close to the empirical evidence across countries (Nijkamp
and Poot, 2005).
We estimated the distribution of quarterly output growth rates and find that they are not nor-
mally distributed,48 and that the moment’s values are quite similar to to those estimated by Fagiolo
et al. (2008) for US data49 Figure 8b plots the skewed distribution.50
The model replicates as well some well known meso and micro stylised facts. Figure 9 plots
the distribution of firm’s size measured by quantity and employees, averaged across periods and
47We estimated the following equation: ln w¯rt = αw +βw lnurt + γw0 cpi
r
t + γw1 pi
r
t + εrt ; where w¯ is the average wage
across classes, cpi is the consumer price index and pi is the productivity index, respectively the ratio between the price
and productivity in t > 0 and the price and productivity in t = 0.
48The Shapiro-Wilk and the skewness and kurtosis tests for normality reject the normality hypothesis.
49Mean=0.00996, standard deviation=0.012, kurtosis=3.76. Skewness is larger in our simulations and equals 0.39.
50We obtain results similar to the empirical evidence also for the fortnightly growth rates.
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Notes. The four panels exhibits cross-correlation plots between the cyclical component of real output and the cyclical
component of inventories growth (7a), inventories/Sales ratio (7b), average wages (7c), and average mark-up (7d) for
10 lags. On the horizontal axis are the number of lags and on the vertical axis the crosscorrelation between the cyclical
components of the two series at a given lag.
Figure 7: Crosscorrelation between the cyclical component of output and other aggregate
variables: inventories, wages, prices and mark-up
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Notes. The left panel (8a) plots the estimation of the Beveridge curve for 60 runs (light grey series) and the estimation
of the Beveridge curve for the pooled sample of the 100 series for 1000 time periods. The red band is the confidence
interval of the aggregate curve. On the horizontal axis is the vacancy ratio (number of vacancies over employment) and
on the vertical axis is the unemployment rate. All series are estimated with a polynomial regression of order 2. The
right panel 8b exhibits the real output growth rate distribution (continuous line) against the normal distribution (dashed
line) for the average growth rate across the 100 runs.
Figure 8: Beveridge curve and output growth rate distribution
pooled across the 100 series. The plot shows the relation between the log size and the log rank,
compared with a log normal distribution with the same average and standard deviation. Both
measures show a striking similarity with real data. The final distribution of firms’ size is related to
their growth process, which, as expected, is also not normally distributed and has a high kurtosis.51
The distribution of firm growth emerging from our model is closer to a Laplace distribution than
to a Gaussian distribution (Figure 9c and 9d) although it does not fit perfectly with a Laplace
distribution.
Firms also differ with respect to their productivity and these differences build through time
and tend to be persistent. We plot the time pattern of the productivity series for the “oldest” 14
firms surviving until the end of the simulation in a random replication (Figure 10c). All firms
tend to maintain their relative position with respect to competitors. Figure 10a plots the average
and standard deviation across all firms across all 100 simulation replicates. The average sharply
increases, as well as the differences across firms (standard deviation).
5111.3 for quarterly growth rate of output and 7.8 for quarterly growth of employees. For both series the Skew-
ness/Kurtosis tests for normality and the Shapiro-Wilk test reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution.
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(1)
VARIABLES Wage (log)
Unemployment (Log) -0.14***
(0.05)
Prod Index 0.00***
(0.00)
CPI 0.02***
(0.00)
Constant 4.21***
(0.22)
Observations 100,100
Number of id 100
R-squared 0.98
within R2 0.981
F 64662
Prob > F 0
Notes. Panel regressions with fixed effects of unemployment on wages. Both variables are in natural logs, and the
coefficient measures the elasticity between them. Prod Index is the index of labour productivity change between t and
t = 0. CPI is the consumer price index between t and t = 0. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 18: Wage curve
We also studied the autocorrelation of firms’ productivity for all firms for the first replication
employing the Cumby-Huizinga test, controlling for heteroskedasticity for the possibility that the
series may exhibit arbitrary autocorrelation (Baum and Schaffer, 2013). Table 19 shows that there
is strong and significant correlation at the micro level, both looking at the range between the first
and the fifth lag, and for each lag, controlling for autocorrelations in the previous lag.
As a result of the vertical interaction between final good firms and capital good suppliers, our
model also shows significant lumpiness in capital stock investment. Figure 10d plots the time
pattern of the capital stock of the “oldest” 14 firms that survive until the end of the simulation
in a random simulation replicate. Capital stocks depreciates through time and investment in new
stocks is clearly lumpy.
Finally, as discussed by Poschke (2015) the average size of firms has increased substantially
in the last century, as well as the dispersion – increasing the skewness of the size distribution.
Figure 10b plots the average of both the within run average and standard deviation of firms across
25 replications. Following an initial decrease, both the average firm size and dispersion increase
substantially.
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Notes. The first two plots show the relation between the log of firm size (horizontal axis) and the log of the size rank
(vertical axis). Size is measured as firm output (9a) and employment 9b. We pool all firms across the 100 time series
and average size over the firm life span. Black circles represent the distribution of simulated firms, whereas grey circles
represent a log normal distribution. The last two plots show the distribution of firm size quarterly growth with respect
to output (9c) and employees (9d).
Figure 9: Log-log plot of firm size distribution
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Notes. The three panels plot micro regularities across the firms. Panel 10a plots the average and the standard deviation
of the productivity of all firms across all 100 simulation replicates. Panel 10b plots the average of the within simulation
average across 25 simulation runs (with confidence interval) and the average standard deviation within 25 simulation
runs. Panel 10c plots the series of the 14 “oldest” firms in the the first simulation replication. Panel 10d plots the capital
stock of 14 “oldest” firms in the the first simulation replication.
Figure 10: Firm productivity, capital, and size
H0: q=0 (serially uncorrelated) H0: q=0 (serially uncorrelated)
HA: s.c. present at range specified HA: s.c. present at range specified
lags chi2 df p-val lag chi2 df p-val
1-1 525.306 1 0.00 1 525.306 1 0.00
1-2 525.309 2 0.00 2 506.186 1 0.00
1-3 540.39 3 0.00 3 451.117 1 0.00
1-4 541.171 4 0.00 4 295.336 1 0.00
1-5 541.877 5 0.00 5 71.669 1 0.00
Notes. Cumby-Huizinga test for autocorrelation for panel data with large sample size (Baum and Schaffer, 2013) under
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation at any lag order. Test robust to heteroskedasticity. Test also corrected for the
possibility that the series may exhibit arbitrary autocorrelation. The left panel report the lag range (between the first
and the the last period). The panel on the right reports the correlation at each lag.
Table 19: Autocorrelation of firm productivity
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G Extra Tables
ϑ
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
0¯.725; 0¯.275 89.30*** 96.36** 103.27*** 110.90*** 119.01***
0¯.775; 0¯.225 84.86*** 93.58 100.05*** 103.97*** 111.82***
λp,1; 0¯.825; 0¯.175 80.25*** 88.24*** 94.01 98.46*** 105.54***
λq,1 0¯.875; 0¯.125 75.27*** 82.21** 89.96*** 94.97 100.63***
0¯.925; 0¯.075 70.82*** 78.07*** 84.08*** 89.46*** 95.45
0¯.975; 0¯.025 67.84*** 73.29*** 79.70*** 84.80*** 90.59***
Notes: Mean values over 20 replications for the average inverse herfindahl index over 2000 simulation steps. The index
is computes using sales, across all sectors. The significance of the difference between the benchmark configuration (in
italics) and each pair of parameters is computed with a t-test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 20: Inverse Herfindahl Index for different levels of competition
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